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UNCTAD’s	World	Investment	Reports	1991-2015:	25	years	of	
narratives	justifying	and	balancing	foreign	investor	rights	
	 Nicolás	M	Perrone*	
	
Abstract	This	article	examines	an	influential	narrative	of	foreign	investor	rights	and	the	international	investment	regime.	It	draws	on	twenty-five	of	the	World	Investment	Reports	(WIRs)	issued	by	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	(1991-2015).	It	argues	that	the	justifications	provided	by	these	reports	have	contributed	to	shaping	a	global	commodity	conception	of	property.	These	WIRs	describe	foreign	investor	rights	following	a	narrative	of	wealth	maximisation	by	transnational	corporations	(TNCs),	and	focus	on	a	TNC-assisted	restructuring	of	host	states	and	local	communities.	Since	the	mid-2000s,	these	reports	have	balanced	this	narrative	because	of	the	increasing	consensus	that	international	investment	treaties	unduly	constrain	regulatory	space.	Ultimately,	however,	this	article	shows	that	the	recent	WIRs	promote	an	approach	to	public	regulation	that	is	not	inconsistent	with	a	global	commodity	conception	of	property.	 	‘[P]roperty	needs	a	tale,	a	story,	a	post	hoc	explanation.’1		
	 1.	Introduction:	Foreign	investor	rights	need	a	story	This	article	aims	to	provide	an	intellectual	context	for	understanding	foreign	investor	rights	in	international	law	and,	particularly,	in	the	international	investment	regime.	I	propose	to	do	this	by	looking	at	the	25	World	Investment	Reports	(WIRs)	issued	by	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	(UNCTAD)	between	1991	and	2015.2	The	objective	is	not	to	explain	the	content	of	these	WIRs,	let	alone	UNCTAD’s																																																									*	Assistant	Professor	in	International	Law,	Durham	Law	School.	I	am	grateful	for	the	comments	of	David	Whyte,	Markus	Wagner,	Andrew	Lang,	Lauge	Poulsen	and	the	participants	of	the	Workshop	series	on	Investment	Law	and	Policy	(ILAP).	I	am	particularly	indebted	to	Karl	Sauvant	and	Stephan	Schill	for	the	discussion	of	earlier	drafts.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	the	International	Institute	for	the	Sociology	of	Law	for	the	generous	funding,	and	Daniel	Cristobal	García	for	his	research	assistance.	And	thanks	as	always	to	Jessica	Lucio	for	her	endless	support	and	encouragement.	All	errors	remain	mine	only.	1	Carol	Rose,	Property	and	Persuasion:	essays	on	the	history,	theory,	and	rhetoric	of	
ownership	(Westview	Press	1994)	38.	2	These	reports	are	the	result	of	an	initiative	promoted	by	Karl	P	Sauvant.	The	first	two	WIRs	were	published	by	the	United	Nation	Centre	on	Transnational	Corporations,	which	was	later	merged	into	UNCTAD.	Previous	literature	about	the	WIRs	include	Torbjörn	Fredriksson,	‘Forty	years	of	UNCTAD	research	on	FDI,’	(2003)	12	Transnat'l	Corp.	1;	Tagi	Sagafi-Nejad	and	John	Dunning,	The	UN	and	Transnational	Corporations:	From	Code	of	
Conduct	to	Global	Compact	(Indiana	University	Press	2008);	Theodore	Moran,	‘The	United	Nations	and	transnational	corporations:	a	review	and	a	perspective,’	(2009)	18	Transnat'l	Corp.	91;	Karl	Sauvant,	‘The	negotiations	of	the	United	Nations	code	of	conduct	on	transnational	corporations:	Experience	and	lessons	learned,’	(2015)	16	JWIT	11.	
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work	during	this	period,	but	to	focus	on	these	reports	as	narratives	that	have	served	to	justify	and	balance	foreign	investor	rights.	As	narratives,	the	WIRs	have	contributed	to	shaping	an	influential	story	about	the	importance	of	attracting	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI),	enabling	transnational	corporations	(TNCs)	and	protecting	foreign	investor	rights	through	international	investment	agreements	(IIAs).	As	Fredriksson	and	Moran	note,	UNCTAD	and	the	WIRs	‘defined	the	mainstream	in	the	policy	area,	and	helped	with	consensus	building.’3	Like	in	any	controversial	field,	naturally,	different	interests	have	been	involved	in	the	production	of	the	WIRs.	But	once	these	reports	are	published,	they	constitute	narratives	about	the	relationship	between	TNCs,	states	and	local	communities.	Looking	at	these	narratives	allows	us	to	explore	‘the	bundle	of	presuppositions,	received	wisdoms,	and	shared	understanding	against	a	background	of	which	legal	and	political	discourse	takes	place’.4	The	WIRs’s	narratives	provide	us	with	a	systemic	view	of	the	international	investment	regime	that	is	arguably	missing	in	the	literature.5	This	view	can	serve	to	justify,	balance	or	criticise	this	regime.	The	WIRs	focus	primarily	on	the	links	between	TNCs,	FDI	and	development.	These	reports	are	not	only	about	IIAs	and	investor-state	dispute	settlement	(ISDS)	–	in	fact,	these	topics	gained	preponderance	only	more	recently.	Fundamentally,	the	WIRs	tell	a	story	where	transnational	corporate	activity	(i.e.	FDI)	can	be	a	catalyst	for	host	country	development.	The	protection	of	foreign	investor	rights	is	only	one	of	the	means	to	support	this	development	strategy.	In	the	1990s,	IIAs	were	publicised,	promoted	and	justified	as	a	key	component	of	a	‘TNC-assisted	restructuring’6.	The	premise	was	that	countries	should	provide	efficient	actors	—in	this	case	TNCs—	with	the	appropriate	type	of	property	rights.7	Enabling	TNCs	to	mix	their	assets	with	local	resources	would	maximise	wealth	and	benefit	host	countries.		The	WIRs	conceive	TNCs	—and	the	institutions	that	facilitate	FDI—	as	means	to	assist	countries	in	restructuring	their	economies	and	meeting	their	development	goals.	FDI	can	provide	an	important	source	of	capital,	bridging	the	investment	gap,	and	help	countries	to	climb	the	value	ladder.	Crucially,	this	requires	a	‘market	enabling	role	of	government	and	…	functional	regulatory	regimes’8.	TNCs	demand	certainty	to	calculate	their	investment	projects,	and	investment	treaty	standards	—like	indirect	expropriation	or	fair	and	equitable	treatment—	describe	the	conduct	that	
																																																								3	Fredriksson	(n	2)	34,	10-1.	Similarly,	Moran	(n	2)	97-9.				4	Richard	Delgado,	‘Legal	Storytelling:	Storytelling	for	Oppositionists	and	Others:	A	Plea	for	Narrative,’	(1989)	87	Mich.L.Rev.	2411,	2413.	For	a	discussion	of	narrative	analysis	in	international	investment	law,	see	Tai-Heng	Cheng	‘Developing	Narratives	in	International	Investment	Law,’	(2011)	9	Santa	Clara	J	Int'l	L	215.	5	See	Martti	Koskenniemi,	‘It’s	not	the	cases,	It’s	the	System,’	18	(2017)	JWIT	343.			6	UNCTAD,	World	investment	report	1995:	transnational	corporations	and	competitiveness	(United	Nations	1995)	262.	7	Douglas	North,	Structure	and	Change	in	Economic	History	(W.W.	Norton	1981)	21.		8	UNCTAD,	World	investment	report	1993:	transnational	corporations	and	integrated	
international	production	(United	Nations	1993)	216.	
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TNCs	expect	from	states.9	This	policy,	however,	is	far	from	promoting	a	
laissez-faire	economic	model.	According	to	the	WIRs,	states	have	the	responsibility	not	only	to	promote	a	business-friendly	environment	but	also	to	maximise	the	benefits	and	minimise	the	costs	of	FDI.		The	WIRs	have	been	influential	in	justifying	and	balancing	foreign	investor	rights	as	a	means	to	development.	Firstly,	the	early	reports	contributed	to	the	diffusion	of	IIAs	by	highlighting	the	importance	of	TNCs	and	the	increasing	competition	to	attract	FDI.	This	competition	has	been	described	as	a	main	driver	for	the	diffusion	of	IIAs.10	UNCTAD	facilitated	this	process	by	organising	several	‘BIT	facilitation	events’11.	According	to	a	2005	study,	it	sponsored	9	rounds	of	negotiations	that	concluded	with	the	signature	of	160	IIAs.12	Secondly,	the	most	recent	WIRs	have	promoted	a	review	process	of	IIAs	following	the	emerging	consensus	that	these	treaties	unduly	constrain	regulatory	space.	The	reports	call	for	more	balance	and	clarity	in	existing	treaties,	particularly	to	reduce	the	risk	of	ISDS,	and	many	states	have	taken	this	policy	advice	seriously.		More	importantly,	the	narratives	of	the	WIRs	are	suitable	for	the	study	I	propose	here	because	UNCTAD	is	a	‘highly	complex	organisation’13.	UNCTAD	is	part	of	the	United	Nations,	and	as	such	its	activities	are	driven	and	monitored	by	a	large	number	of	states.	Until	1993,	most	of	UN’s	work	on	TNCs	was	carried	out	by	the	United	Nations	Centre	for	Transnational	Corporations	(UNCTC).	Historically,	Global	South	countries	relied	on	UNCTAD	and	the	UNCTC	to	promote	critical	thinking	about	the	international	economy.	UNCTC,	for	instance,	dedicated	most	of	its	efforts	to	advance	a	binding	code	of	conduct	for	TNCs.	But	this	changed	in	the	early	1990s	when	the	United	States	promoted	the	closure	of	UNCTC	transferring	its	activities	to	UNCTAD’s	Division	on	Investment	and	Enterprise.	While	this	meant	the	end	of	the	code	of	conduct	project,	it	is	far	from	evident	that	UNCTAD’s	later	work	on	TNCs	reproduced	the	views	of	the	United	States	or	a	neoliberal	model.	The	literature	on	UNCTAD	instead	highlights	the	highly	complex	nature	of	this	organisation,	where	different	countries	and	experts	pursue	their	agendas	and	some	of	the	staff	promote	a	WTO-like	
																																																								9	UNCTAD,	World	investment	report	1996:	Investment,	trade	and	international	policy	
arrangements	(United	Nations	1996)	189-90;	UNCTAD,	World	investment	report	1998:	
Trends	and	Determinants	(United	Nations	1998)	117.	10	Zachary	Elkins,	Andrew	Guzman	and	Beth	Simmons,	‘Competing	for	Capital:	The	Diffusion	of	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties,	1960-2000,’	(2006)	60	Int'l	Org.	811.		11	UNCTAD,	World	investment	report	2002:	Transnational	corporations	and	export	
competitiveness	(United	Nations	2002)	8.		12	‘On	the	basis	of	this	material	it	appears	that	this	activity	has	been	a	full	success	both	in	terms	of	the	numeric	achievement	of	160	BITs	that	resulted	from	the	9	rounds	and	in	terms	of	the	hands-on	training	and	negotiation	experience	aspects	highlighted	in	the	trust	fund	project	document,’	Olf	Karsegard,	Pedro	Bravo	and	Hubert	Blomet,	‘Final	In-Depth	Evaluation:	UNCTAD	Work	Programme	on	Capacity	Building	in	Developing	Countries	on	issues	in	International	Investment	Agreements’,	July	2005,	10-1.	Available	at	http://unctad.org/en/Docs/	domepu200711_en.pdf		(last	visited	2	March	2017).		13	Matthias	Finger	and	Bérangère	Magarinos-Ruchat,	‘The	Transformation	of	International	Public	Organizations,’	in	Dennis	Dijkzeul	and	Yves	Beigbeder	(ed.),	Rethinking	
International	Organizations:	Pathology	and	Promise	(Berghahn	Books	2003)	140,	141.	
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bureaucracy.14	This	plurality	of	actors	and	interests	suggests	that	the	narratives	in	the	WIRs	are	not	extreme	or	radical.	On	the	contrary,	the	way	in	which	the	WIRs	see	the	relationship	between	TNCs,	FDI	and	IIAs	arguably	integrates	different	interests	representing	a	pragmatic	middle-ground	approach.	To	analyse	the	narrative	in	the	WIRs,	this	article	relies	on	theoretical	and	socio-legal	approaches	to	property.	Traditionally,	the	legal	analysis	of	foreign	investor	rights	would	imply	looking	at	IIAs	and	investment	awards.	But	this	approach	is	not	comprehensive	unless	we	assume	that	investment	arbitrators	alone	have	been	involved	in	the	task	of	justifying	transnational	corporate	rights	and	balancing	these	entitlements	against	public	interest.	If	we	conceive	property	as	a	social	institution,	property	is	a	way	in	which	people	—not	only	adjudicators—	describe	proper	life	and	the	role	of	material	resources	to	make	this	life	possible.15	The	narratives	of	property,	in	this	way,	serve	both	to	describe	and	justify	the	social	order.	This	view	relates	to	the	work	of	Rose	and	Macpherson,	who	claim	that	‘property	needs	a	tale,	a	story,	a	post	hoc	explanation’,	or	that	property	is	controversial	and,	for	this	reason,	it	requires	justifications.16		In	approaching	the	narratives	in	the	WIRs,	this	article	is	inspired	by	the	work	of	Rose	and	Alexander	on	property	as	storytelling	and	property	narratives.17	The	premise	of	their	work	is	that	the	outcome	of	takings	cases	is	related	to	what	the	adjudicators	–and	their	epistemic	and	political	communities–	are	trying	to	achieve	with	a	property	system.	The	narrative	of	the	WIRs,	arguably,	provide	some	of	this	background	information.	Rose	and	Alexander	claim	that	there	are	two	competing	conceptions	of	property:	property	as	wealth	or	commodity	and	property	as	propriety.	As	a	commodity,	property	is	a	means	for	individuals	to	maximise	wealth	without	public	or	private	interference.	As	propriety,	property	is	‘the	material	foundation	for	creating	the	proper	social	order,	the	private	basis	for	the	public	good.’18	While	a	commodity	understanding	of	property	highlights	the	distinction	between	the	private	and	the	public	domain,	property	as	propriety	underscores	the	relational	character	of	property.	This	conception	of	property	is	concerned	with	how	society	should	be	structured,	as	opposed	to	striking	the	right	balance	between	property	and	regulation.19	A	commodity	conception	of	foreign	investors	rights	would	promote	the	role	of	TNCs	as	wealth-maximising	actors.	This	would	put	pressure	on	local	
																																																								14	ibid	156,	159;	Sagafi-Nejad	and	Dunning	(n	2)	121,	124-5,	166-7;	Fredriksson	(n	2)	34-5;	Moran	(2)	97,	107.	15	Neal	Milner,	‘Ownership	Rights	and	Rites	of	Ownership,’	(1993)	18	L.&	Soc.Inquiry	227,	251.	16	Rose,	(n	1);	C.B.	Macpherson,	‘The	Meaning	of	Property,’	in	C.B.	Macpherson	(ed.),	
Property,	Mainstream	and	Critical	Positions	(University	of	Toronto	Press	1978)	1,	11.	See	also	Nicholas	Blomley,	‘Landscapes	of	Property,’	(1998)	32	L.&	Soc'y	Rev	567.	17	Rose,	(n	1)	9,	50-1.	Gregory	Alexander	Commodity	&	Propriety:	Competing	Visions	of	
Property	in	American	Legal	Thought,	1776-1970	(Chicago	University	Press	2008).	18	ibid	1.		19	ibid	1-3.	
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communities	to	adjust	to	the	expectations	of	TNCs.20	In	this	narrative,	however,	this	adjusting	process	is	not	a	way	to	benefit	TNCs	but	to	maximise	and	benefit	from	economic	growth.	It	is	crucial,	for	this	reason,	to	strike	the	right	regulatory	balance.	A	propriety	conception,	on	the	other	hand,	would	start	from	the	premise	that	different	communities	have	different	preferences,	maximising	wealth	may	be	one	of	them,	and	TNCs	would	be	expected	to	engage	with	each	community	and	respect	their	preferences.	Fundamentally,	progressive	property	scholars	highlight	that	private	property	creates	obligations	on	property	owners	to	respect	those	local	preferences.21	The	WIRs	reveal	a	global	narrative	of	property	as	commodity,	which	has	been	balanced	in	the	recent	years	with	a	discourse	in	favour	of	public	regulation.	The	reports	show	a	strong	continuity	with	the	importance	of	attracting	FDI	to	maximise	wealth	and	promote	development.	As	the	WIRs	explain,	this	requires	a	large	number	of	policy	and	legal	changes	–	not	just	signing	IIAs.	Since	the	first	WIR,	in	1991,	the	policy	premise	of	the	reports	has	been	to	implement	these	changes	while	maximising	the	benefits	and	minimising	the	costs	of	FDI.	But	how	this	is	done	has	changed	throughout	the	years.	The	WIRs	before	mid-2000s	promoted	market	supervision	regulation	(e.g.	competition	laws)	but	were	cautious	about	encouraging	public	regulation	to	deal	with	environmental	or	human	rights	challenges.	The	more	recent	reports	highlight	the	need	of	public	regulation	to	ensure	sustainability.	Fundamentally,	this	shows	a	shift	in	emphasis,	as	the	focus	of	the	discussion	moved	from	implementing	a	TNC-assisted	restructuring	to	the	challenges	of	this	process	–	and,	increasingly,	IIAs	and	ISDS	as	obstacles	to	public	regulation.	In	most	cases,	however,	regulation	and	sustainability	do	not	seem	to	address	community	preferences	(or	vulnerabilities)	but	market	failures	and	negative	externalities.	The	recent	WIRs	promote	public	regulation	and	the	reorientation	of	IIAs	but	in	the	shadow	of	a	global	commodity	conception	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Facilitating	FDI	requires	states	(and	communities),	as	the	reports	recognise,	to	catch	up	with	global	markets	and	the	needs	of	TNCs	in	many	areas	and	sectors.	This	narrative	is	in	permanent	tension	with	local	preferences,	despite	references	to	a	global	community	that	demands	more	market	choices,	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR),	and	means	to	climb	the	global	value	ladder.22	The	approach	taken	by	the	WIRs,	in	this	way,	promotes	the	sustainability	of	a	global	commodity	conception	of	property.	The	consequences	of	this	social	
																																																								20	Jeremy	Waldron,	The	Rule	of	Law	and	the	Measure	of	Property	(CUP	2012)	105-6.	See	also	Nicolás	Perrone,	‘The	international	investment	regime	and	local	populations:	are	the	weakest	voices	unheard?,’	(2016)	7	TLT	383.		21	Gregory	Alexander,	Eduardo	Peñalver,	Joseph	Singer	and	Laura	Underkuffler,	“A	Statement	of	Progressive	Property,”	(2009)	94	Cornell	L.Rev.	743.	22	UNCTAD,	World	investment	report	1999:	foreign	direct	investment	and	the	challenge	of	
development	(United	Nations	1999)	150,	346-7;	UNCTAD,	World	investment	report	2015:	
reforming	international	investment	governance	(United	Nations	2015)	127-8.	
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arrangement	—such	as	the	asymmetric	bargaining	power	between	TNCs	and	states—	are	made	‘all	too	sustainable.’23	 	This	article	examines	the	policy	discussions	and	recommendations	in	the	WIRs	as	evidence	of	how	these	reports	conceive	a	TNC-assisted	restructuring	of	host	states	and	local	communities.	It	organises	the	25	WIRs	(1991-2015)	in	three	periods,	each	representing	the	moment	of	implementation	(1991-2003),	consolidation	(2004-2011)	and	reorientation	(2012-2015)	of	TNC-assisted	restructuring.	Each	section	looks	at	the	narratives	related	to	1)	the	relationship	between	FDI	and	development,	2)	the	legal	and	regulatory	framework	for	TNCs	and	states,	and	3)	the	importance	and	problems	of	IIAs	and	ISDS.	They	include	in-text	references	to	facilitate	the	discussion	of	the	WIRs.	This	organisation	aims	to	show	both	the	continuity	between	the	reports	–they	build	upon	each	other–	as	well	as	the	gradual	shift	in	favour	of	balancing	foreign	investor	rights.	This	article	concludes	by	highlighting	that	IIAs	and	ISDS	still	operate	within	a	global	commodity	conception	of	foreign	investor	rights.	This	vision	reflects	in	the	kind	of	social	order	that	is	possible,	and	in	the	relationship	between	TNCs,	host	states	and	local	communities.			
2.	Implementing	TNC-Assisted	Restructuring	(1991-2003)	The	1991-2003	WIRs	played	a	fundamental	role	in	advocating	TNC-assisted	restructuring.	These	reports	describe	the	worldwide	implementation	of	investor-friendly	measures,	while	promoting	these	policies	and	making	specific	recommendations	to	maximise	the	benefits	and	minimise	the	costs	of	FDI.	The	reports	classify	these	measures	into	three	generations.	The	first	generation	consists	of	measures	related	to	FDI	liberalisation,	facilitation	and	protection.	The	second	generation	shows	many	governments	going	‘further	and	actively	seek[ing]	to	attract	FDI	by	‘marketing’	their	countries.’	This	attitude	responds	to	the	increasing	competition	for	FDI,	a	recurrent	topic	in	the	early	WIRs.	The	third	generation	takes	the	‘general	enabling	framework	for	FDI	and	a	proactive	approach	towards	attracting	FDI	as	a	starting	point.’	In	this	investor-friendly	context,	governments	target	foreign	investors	according	to	the	country’s	development	priorities	(WIR	2001:	123-4).	These	three	generations	of	measures	are	inspired	by	the	1990s	Washington	consensus	on	development	thinking.	Private	actors	are	the	most	efficient	wealth-maximisers,	and	governments	should	facilitate	private	activities.	Following	these	premises,	TNC-assisted	restructuring	is	far	from	suggesting	an	absent	state.	The	WIRs	highlight	that	states	have	fundamental	responsibilities	in	this	model.	Governments	need	to	set	up	the	institutions	capable	of	attracting,	enabling	and	protecting	FDI,	while	promoting	measures	to	increase	the	development	impact	of	these	investments.	UNCTAD	was	sceptical	that	FDI	inflows	would	increase	once	an	enabling	framework	was	in	place,	noting	that	‘the	success	of	proactive																																																									23	David	Kennedy,	A	world	of	struggle:	how	power,	law,	and	expertise	shape	global	political	
economy	(Princeton	University	Press	2016)	15-6,	93.	See	also	David	Schneiderman,	
Resisting	economic	globalization:	critical	theory	and	international	investment	law	(Palgrave	2013)	56.	
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efforts	depends	on	the	quality	of	the	basic	economic	FDI	determinants’	(WIR	2001:	123-4;	WIR	1998:	89-98).	The	analysis	of	the	1991-2003	WIRs	consists	of	four	sections.	The	first	introduces	a	new	global	economy	in	which	TNCs	are	catalytic	agents	of	development,	but	where	there	is	fierce	competition	for	FDI.	The	second	section	examines	the	government	responsibilities	in	this	new	global	economy.	It	shows	how	host	countries	had	to	adapt	to	transnational	corporate	needs,	while	also	focusing	on	the	risks	of	liberalisation.	The	third	and	fourth	sections	look	at	the	importance	and	problems	of	IIAs	and	ISDS.		
	
2.1.	Foreign	Investment	and	Development:	Opportunities	and	
Increasing	Competition	in	a	Global	Economy	As	the	WIRs	explain,	‘[t]wenty	years	ago	or	so,	many	governments	saw	TNCs	as	part	of	the	‘development	problem’.	Today,	TNCs	are	seen	as	part	of	the	‘solution’’	(WIR	1999:	154-6).	In	the	1990s,	countries	realised	that	TNCs	are	‘agents	of	development’	changing	their	strategies	toward	foreign	investment	(WIR	1992:	100).	The	reports	agree	with	this	view	describing	TNCs	as	‘catalytic	agents	in	the	development’	of	countries	(WIR	1991:	90-1;	WIR	1996:	129;	WIR	1997:124;	WIR	2003:	85-6).	TNCs	‘are	major	organisers	of	economic	activity,’	and	they	bring	into	host	countries	technology	and	organisation	skills,	while	also	promoting	a	business-enabling	environment	(WIR	1994:	163,	167;	WIR	1992:	190-2;	WIR	2003:	165-6).	By	mixing	their	‘proprietary	assets’	with	the	location-specific	assets	provided	by	countries,	TNCs	can	promote	the	competitiveness	of	a	country	(WIR	1995:	137).	In	this	new	context,	the	advice	to	countries	was	to	work	on	their	investment	potential.	In	the	early	1990s,	the	WIRs	underscore	that	countries	should	adapt	to	a	new	scale	for	their	policies	—a	regional	and	world	scale—	as	TNCs	have	been	doing	(WIR	1991:	85-6;	WIR	1992:	4-5).	These	reports	identify	a	change	of	economic	paradigm	where	FDI	is	part	of	an	integral	process	of	trade,	finance,	technology,	services,	and	labour	movement.	‘[T]he	liberalisation	of	international	markets’	leads	to	an	‘integrated	international	production	system,’	which	goal	is	‘to	pursue	greater	economic	efficiency’	(WIR	1994:	286).	This	same	goal	also	justified	privatisations	as	a	solution	to	‘the	disappointing	performance	of	many	public	sector	enterprises’	in	Eastern	Europe	and	Latin	America.	The	main	rationale	for	privatisations	was	‘pragmatic,	namely,	the	need	to	improve	the	provision	of	goods	and	services’	(WIR	1992:	86).	In	this	vein,	FDI	is	more	than	an	instrument	to	join	global	value	chains	(GVCs)	and	improve	public	utilities,	it	is	constitutive	of	a	new	model	of	development	that	the	liberalisation	of	capital	movements	constitutes	in	the	first	place	(WIR	1998:	97-9;	1999:	150-2).	TNCs	have	a	crucial	role	in	‘the	establishment	of	a	market	economy’	by	disseminating	private	forms	of	ownership	and	entrepreneurship	(WIR	1994:	104-5,	111,	WIR	1997:	102).	The	WIRs	also	highlight	that	privatisations	entail	‘a	degree	of	transformation	of	the	economic	culture’	(WIR	1992:	89-90)	and	that	TNCs	are	necessary	for	developing	countries	‘to	become	insiders	in	a	global	network’	(WIR	1993:	216;	WIR	1994:	29-30).	These	transformations,	
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ultimately,	will	give	rise	to	a	‘global	corporate	citizenship’,	which	‘societal	boundaries	...	in	the	twenty-first	century	will	be	the	global	community’	(WIR1999:	370).	The	WIRs	note	that	governments	recognise	the	transformative	role	of	FDI,	and	compete	to	attract	these	flows.	This	competition	can	be	a	positive	mechanism	to	diffuse	a	FDI-friendly	regime	for	development	(WIR	1998:	95-6;	WIR	1999:	150-2,	154-6;	WIR	2000:	146-8;	WIR	2001:	122-4;	WIR	2003:	85-6).	Countries	that	compete	‘can	move	up	the	value-added	ladder’	(WIR	1999:	151).	The	WIRs	remind	countries	of	the	strength	of	this	competition	(WIR	1995:	301;	WIR	1997:	101-2,	210-1;	WIR	1998:	81-3,	95-9).	At	first,	countries	were	competing	by	providing	a	friendly	‘regulatory	framework	for	FDI,’	creating	‘a	new	national	approach	towards	FDI’	(WIR	1993:	214-5).	IIAs	played	a	fundamental	role	in	this	process	because	these	treaties	further	encouraged	the	convergence	of	national	laws	in	key	issues.	This	convergence	led	to	a	point,	however,	where	FDI-friendly	regulatory	changes	were	not	helpful	to	attract	FDI	flows	anymore.	Countries	had	to	adopt	a	more	proactive	attitude	(WIR	1993:	214-5;	WIR	1998:	102-3).		At	the	same	time,	the	WIRs	recognise	that	FDI	is	not	enough	to	guarantee	development.	The	1999	report	notes	that	‘an	investment	(including	FDI)-friendly	policy	framework	is	also	a	development-friendly	policy	framework’	(WIR	1999:	155).	But	while	this	report	claims	that	‘there	is	a	considerable	overlap	between	the	objectives	of	host	countries	and	TNCs’	(WIR	1999:	155;	WIR	1993:	214-5;	WIR	1996:	131),	it	also	highlights	that	the	overlap	is	incomplete	(WIR	1999:	154-6).	Some	countries	had	too	high	expectations	regarding	the	benefits	of	FDI,	when	in	reality	‘FDI	plays	in	most	instances	only	a	complementary	and	at	best	a	catalytic	role’	(WIR	1999:	152).	TNCs	‘offer	the	potential	for	accessing’	assets	such	as	technology	(WIR	1999:	317),	but	opening	up	to	TNCs	may	not	be	enough	to	reap	the	benefits	and	minimise	the	costs	of	FDI	(WIR	2001:	131-2;	WIR	2002:	152-3).	‘The	groundwork	for	making	markets	work	well	…	has	to	be	laid	down	by	the	host	country	government	(WIR	2003:	86;	WIR	2001:	5-6).		
2.2.	Government	Primary	Responsibilities:	Facilitate	TNC	Plans,	
Be	Cautious	About	Public	Regulation	From	the	first	WIR	in	1991,	these	reports	suggest	that	the	role	of	states	is	to	pursue	development,	and	therefore	governments	should	not	disregard	FDI	flows.	‘Development	is	the	fundamental	objective	of	developing	country	governments	and	of	the	international	community	as	a	whole’	(WIR	1998:	75;	WIR	1996:	158-9).	The	WIRs	note	that	the	‘primary	responsibility’	of	host	countries	is	‘to	make	their	investment	climate	congenial	to	transnational	corporations’	(WIR	1991:	90).	‘[M]ore	attention	needs	to	be	given	to	policies	that	are	in	line	with	market	forces’	(WIR2001:	165).	In	this	new	global	economy,	the	role	of	governments	is	to	match	‘the	specific	functional	needs	of	corporate	investors’	with	‘specific	locational	products’	(WIR	2001:	124;	WIR	1998:	97-9).	The	2001	WIR	explains	that:			[w]hile	many	countries	promote	FDI,	the	most	successful	ones	do	this	in	a	business-like	manner,	with	effective	image	building,	low	transaction	costs	for	investors,	careful	targeting,	direct	interaction	
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with	investors	and	good	support	and	follow-up	services	(WIR	2001:	5).	This	new	role	for	states	does	not	mean	an	absent	state.	The	state	has	different	but	fundamental	functions	in	the	new	global	economy.	The	WIRs	reject	laissez-faire	and	remind	states	—according	to	neo-institutional	thinking—	of	their	fundamental	role	in	setting	up	the	basic	economic	institutions	(WIR	1999:	324-8).	The	reports	explain	that	this	transformation	does	not	aim	to	weaken	the	state	but	to	redefine	its	functions	(WIR	1994:	311).	The	state	has	to	work	in	tandem	with	the	new	means	to	reach	economic	development,	essentially	FDI.	In	a	number	of	occasions,	the	early	WIRs	highlight	the	contrast	this	represents	with	the	past.	During	the	1960s	and	1970s,	the	goal	of	governments	was	to	control	the	activity	of	TNCs	steering	FDI	to	fulfil	state	development	goals.	In	the	1990s,	there	is	a	fundamental	policy	shift	as	governments	move	away	from	direct	and	indirect	forms	of	state	control	(WIR	1992:	100;	WIR	1996:	191;	WIR	1997:	75-7,	210-1;	WIR	1999:	324-8;	WIR	2003:	85-6).		According	to	the	WIRs,	governments	are	responsible	to	‘catch	up	with	the	market’	(WIR	1996:	129).	They	need	to	be	‘restructured	according	to	modern	organizational	and	management	practices’	(WIR	1993:	216)	What	is	needed	is	a	‘market	enabling	role	of	governments’	or	a	‘national	enabling	framework’	(WIR	1993:	216).	The	1996	report	notes	that	the	international	order	is	overwhelmed	by	global	economic	reality,	but	that	many	states	were	lagging	behind	this	new	reality	(WIR1996:	129,	163-6).	There	is	a	need	to	reduce	distortions	and	establish	positive	standards,	redefining	rights	and	obligations	as	well	as	strengthening	the	stability,	predictability	and	transparency	of	the	legal	order	(WIR	1994:	311).	Governments	should	entice	TNCs	to	do	what	they	would	like	to	see	done,	‘as	opposed	[to]	unilaterally	seeking	to	impose	their	objectives	on	them’	(WIR	1999:	154-6;	WIR	1995:	154).			
2.2.1.	Enabling	TNCs:	A	Transactional	Model	for	Foreign	Investment	
Relations	Catching	up	with	the	market,	with	the	reality	of	TNCs	and	GVCs,	requires	states	to	undergo	a	profound	transformation.	This	transformation	affects	not	only	the	structure	of	states	but	also	their	relationship	with	TNCs.	According	to	the	narrative	of	the	WIRs,	this	relationship	is	no	longer	defined	by	public	control,	but	rather	by	a	transactional	model.	The	1991-2003	WIRs	describe	FDI	as	the	result	of	a	transaction,	a	deal,	a	bargain	between	TNCs	and	host	states	(WIR1992:	4-5,	190-2,	295-7;	WIR1997:	159-204;	WIR1999:	154-6,	177;	WIR2000:	170).	TNCs	offer	a	bundle	of	assets,	such	as	technology,	and	host	countries	offer	a	package	of	location-specific	assets.	The	WIRs	normalise	this	transactional	model,	in	which	many	TNCs	can	bargain	for	property	rights	and	shop	around	looking	for	the	best	match	for	their	business	expectations.		Many	of	the	policy	suggestions	in	the	WIRs	are	consistent	with	a	transactional	paradigm.	The	first	reports	note	that	state	reliance	on	TNCs	to	restructure	and	develop	the	economy	requires	good	negotiation	skills	(WIR1992,	190-2;	WIR1999:	177,	324-8).	States	are	often	providing	
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commitments	and	incentives	to	attract	FDI	(WIR1998:	102-3).	This	is	because	either	there	is	increasing	competition	for	FDI	or	host	state	institutions	are	not	trustworthy.	The	general	applicable	framework,	as	a	result,	sometimes	needs	to	be	‘augmented’	and	even	‘overshadowed’	by	contractual	provisions	(WIR	1999:	177,	324-8).	According	to	the	reports,	these	contractual	provisions	are	more	common	in	countries	that	lack	a	record	of	successful	dealing	with	foreign	investors.	It	is	particularly	interesting,	in	this	regard,	that	even	in	areas	such	as	natural	resources	and	infrastructure	—where	the	local	resources	are	immobile—	the	WIRs	focus	on	state	incentives	and	how	to	deal	with	the	anti-competitive	nature	of	market-power	inducements.	They	do	not	discuss	the	potential	benefits	that	states	can	make	from	corporate	competition	(WIR	1997:	159-63,	210-1).	The	reports	justify	this	approach	because	TNCs	operate	more	comfortably	in	this	transactional	model	as	a	result	of	their	institutional	capacity	(WIR	1999:	324-8;	WIR	2004:	189).			The	WIRs	also	highlight	that	sometimes	governments	are	so	anxious	competing	for	FDI	that	‘may	not	be	fully	aware	of	the	consequences	of	their	decisions’	(WIR	1997:	204,	186-9,	210-1).	Since	policy	is	no	longer	enough	to	attract	FDI,	states	need	to	make	commitments	to	increase	corporate	profit	or	reduce	political	risk.	The	early	reports	warn	of	the	dangers	of	an	incentive	war,	which	would	represent	a	zero-sum	game	for	states	(WIR	1992:	295-7;	WIR	1997:	101-2;	WIR	1998:	102-3;	WIR	1999:	186).	They	note	that	there	is	a	need	for	international	cooperation	to	limit	incentives	(WIR	1994:	335;	WIR	1995:	301;	WIR	1998:	81-3).24			
2.2.2.	The	Trade-Offs:	Regulating	FDI	and	TNCs			The	early	WIRs	note	that	there	are	trade-offs	in	the	implementation	of	a	TNC-assisted	restructuring	of	the	economy.	The	1994	report	recommends	states	to	take	liberalisation	of	FDI	with	care.	‘The	liberalisation	process	…	involves	difficult	choices	between	desirable	outcomes	and	trade-offs	between	objectives’	(WIR	1994:	311).	Some	state	action	may	be	advisable	if	it	responds	to	reaping	the	benefits	of	FDI	or	curbing	negative	externalities	or	market	failures.	In	relation	to	FDI	benefits,	the	same	report	highlights	that	‘passive	reliance	on	market	forces	may	not	be	the	best	strategy’	(WIR	1994:	76,	111).		The	WIRs	acknowledge	that	FDI	not	always	leads	to	development,	but	it	partially	blames	host	states	for	this.	States	need	to	implement	active	policies	to	turn	FDI	into	development	(WIR	2002:	152-3;	WIR	2003:	207).	This	requires	expanding	the	FDI	policy	list	from	attracting	and	protecting	FDI	to	the	active	promotion	of	domestic	linkages	(WIR	2001:	5-6,	131-2;	WIR	2003:	85-6).	The	2003	report	goes	further	suggesting	that	states	should	have	some	development-oriented	regulatory	flexibility	to	maximise	the	contribution	of	FDI	(WIR	2003:	145,	171-2;	WIR	1998:	74).																																																										24	The	competition	for	foreign	investment	has	been	a	long-time	preoccupation	for	the	United	Nations.	In	1973,	the	group	of	experts	on	TNCs	noted	that	‘The	most	urgent	point	at	issue	among	the	developing	countries	is	that	of	competition	among	themselves	for	foreign	investment,’	Sagafi-Nejad	and	Dunning	(n	2)	97.			
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In	relation	to	market	failures,	the	WIRs	remind	governments	that	they	have	‘a	major	role	to	play	in	improving	social	welfare	by	correcting	the	distortions	in	the	price/market	system	arising	from	the	externalities’	(WIR	1992:	225-6).	The	reports	do	not	challenge	the	importance	of	public	regulation,	but	promote	a	neoliberal	approach	to	it.	They	reject	politics	as	an	appropriate	criterion	to	regulate.	Politics	only	focuses	on	short-term	costs,	disregarding	long-term	benefits	(WIR	1999:	136-7;	WIR	2000:	159-60).	The	criterion	governing	FDI	policy	should	be	efficiency	and	the	rule	of	law	as	opposed	to	politics	and	the	rule	of	power	(WIR	1997:124,	231-3;	WIR	2000:	159-60;	WIR	2003:	95-6).	Regulation	is	justified	only	in	cases	of	market	failures	(WIR	1997:	231-3;	WIR	1999:	316-8;	WIR	2003:	107).	The	WIRs	indicate	that	FDI	activity	is	normally	positive	as	long	as	governments	promote	market	supervision	regulation,	such	as	competition	laws,	controlling	TNCs	from	abusing	their	market	power	(WIR	1994:	286-8;	WIR	1995:	218-9;	WIR	1997:	124;	WIR	1998:	94-5;	WIR	2004:	191-4).	Against	this	background,	the	reports	are	cautions	about	public	regulation.	They	note	that	if	states	do	not	have	the	administrative	capabilities,	‘it	may	be	better	to	minimize	market	interventions	and	simply	reduce	obstacles	in	the	way	of	FDI,	minimize	business	costs	and	leave	resource	allocations	to	the	market’	(WIR	1999:	325,	174-6).	This	does	not	mean	that	the	WIRs	do	not	focus	on	other	strategies	to	minimise	the	costs	associated	to	FDI.	The	1994	and	1999	WIRs,	for	instance,	introduce	and	develop	the	idea	of	global	CSR	(WIR	1999:	345-6,	351,	360,	366).	But	this	does	not	change	the	cautious	approach	to	public	regulation.	The	2003	WIR	highlights	that:		[e]ven	where	market	failures	lead	freer	FDI	to	be	harmful,	there	may	be	a	case	for	restricting	it	only	if	a	host	government	has	the	capacity	to	design	and	mount	effective	interventions	that	result	in	a	socially	or	economically	better	result.	The	cost	of	government	failure	must	not	outweigh	market	failure;	if	it	does,	the	economy	is	worse	off	(WIR	2003:	104).			
2.3.	The	Role	of	IIAs:	Permanent	or	Temporary?	According	to	the	WIRs,	IIAs	should	be	examined	in	the	context	of	TNC-assisted	restructuring.	In	this	context,	IIAs	fulfil	three	key	functions:	1)	they	establish	and	lock-in	this	model;	2)	they	promote	the	necessary	domestic	policy	reforms;	and	3)	they	give	a	positive	signal	to	global	markets.		First,	IIAs	serve	to	establish	and	lock-in	the	TNC-assisted	restructuring	of	the	economy.	These	treaties	clarify	‘the	rights	and	obligations	of	the	parties	involved	in	international	investment	relations’	(WIR	1999:	326).	Through	IIAs,	states	provide	foreign	investors	with	fair	and	equitable	treatment,	protection	against	expropriation	and	ISDS,	all	means	to	establish	a	friendly	investment	climate	and	enforce	foreign	investor	rights.	In	essence,	the	treaties	help	governments	to	resist	the	temptation	of	short-term	politics.	The	reports	note	that	governments	were	conscious	of	this	when	singing	IIAs	and	accepting	ISDS	(WIR	1993:	214-5;	WIR	1998:	117-8;	WIR	2001:	5-6;	WIR	2003:	115-7).	They	were	seeking:		
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to	bind	themselves	with	respect	to	actions	and	measures	that	they	do	not	wish	to	take,	with	the	twin	purpose	of	creating	a	favourable	investment	climate	that	will	attract	FDI	and	make	it	more	difficult	for	such	measures	to	be	taken	in	the	future	(WIR	1996:	194).		Second,	IIAs	set	the	framework	for	domestic	policymaking	(WIR	1999:	326-8;	WIR	2000:	146-8;	WIR	2003:	39).	Liberalisation	was	not	enough	to	consolidate	this	economic	transformation	(WIR	1994:	286-8,	291-3;	WIR	1996:	182-4).	National	treatment	and	non-discrimination	are	not	the	main	standards	of	IIAs.	The	focus	was	put	on	standards	that	describe	‘the	conduct	that	is	expected’	from	states	(WIR	1996:	189;	WIR	1998:	117-8;	WIR	1999:	174-6).	This	is	‘far	more	than	mere	equality	of	treatment’	(WIR	1996:	183).	The	1996	report	highlights	that:	[i]nvestment-protection	provisions	go	beyond	liberalization	measures.	In	a	way,	they	move	along	another	plane.	Although	they	are	primarily	directed	at	possible	measures	of	host	governments,	they	may	best	be	understood	as	efforts	to	counteract	the	perceived	uncertainties	of	current	international	economic	relations.	Through	legal	commitments,	they	seek	to	establish	a	degree	of	stability,	transparency	and	predictability	that	circumstances	do	not	provide	(WIR	1996:	194).	Third,	IIAs	give	a	positive	signal	to	TNCs	reducing	the	perception	of	risk	(WIR	1994:	311;	WIR	1996:	147;	WIR	1999:	117-8).	The	premise	that	IIAs	serve	to	attract	FDI	has	been	subject	to	intense	debate,	and	studies	provide	different	conclusions.	The	WIRs	remain	cautious	about	this	(WIR	1998:	90,	117-8;	WIR	2003:	89-91,	171-2).	IIAs	give	a	positive	signal	to	markets	as	foreign	investors	‘appear	to	regard	BITs	as	part	of	a	good	investment	framework’	(WIR	2003:	91).	But	this	would	not	mean	that	these	treaties	attract	FDI	by	themselves.	‘[T]he	regulatory	framework	for	FDI	—at	whatever	level—	is	at	best	enabling.	Whether	FDI	actually	flows	depends	mainly	on	the	economic	determinants	in	host	countries’	(WIR	2003:	171;	WIR	1996:	166;	WIR	2001:	122-4).		While	the	WIRs	reveal	a	positive	view	about	IIAs	in	the	1990s,	it	turns	out	that	these	treaties	were	meant	to	be	temporary	according	to	the	1996	report.	This	WIR	describes	investment	protection	as	a	‘development-exception	category’	or	a	‘special	development	provision’	(WIR	1996:	194).	Temporary	measures	that	would	no	longer	be	necessary	when	‘the	international	norms	of	protection	will	have	been	‘internalized’	in	the	law	of	all	countries	concerned’	(WIR	1996:	194).		
	 	
2.4.	Early	Thoughts	on	IIAs:	Too	Much	TNC	Control?	In	the	1991-2003	period,	the	WIRs	promote	a	positive	relationship	between	IIAs,	FDI,	and	development.	When	they	recognise	some	problems,	by	the	end	of	the	1990s,	these	are	related	to	foreign	investor	rights	and	IIAs.	Discussing	the	Ethyl	v	Canada	dispute,	the	1998	report	remarks	that	the	debate	is	moving	‘away	from	narrow	technical	issues	and	towards	a	wide-ranging	discussion	of	regulation	and	globalization’	(WIR	1998:	60-1).	This	WIR	recognises	that	a	TNC-assisted	restructuring	creates	‘more	‘space’	for	[foreign	investors]’	(WIR	1998:	97).	The	liberalization	of	FDI	and	IIAs	
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‘allow	firms	greater	freedom	in	making	international	location	decisions	and	in	choosing	the	mode	for	serving	each	market	and	meeting	functional	needs’	(WIR	2001:	6,	5-6).	These	increasing	rights	and	privileges	that	TNCs	enjoy	over	domestic	resources,	the	WIRs	admit,	can	provide	foreign	investors	with	an	‘[e]xcessive	influence	on	economic	affairs	and	decision	making,	with	possible	negative	effects	on	industrial	development	and	national	security’	(WIR	2003:	88,	104;	WIR	2004:	124,	191-4).	The	WIRs	note	that	excessive	TNC	control	puts	countries	in	a	difficult	dilemma.	‘Treaty-based	controls	over	the	scope	and	legal	requirements	of	a	valid	taking	of	foreign-owned	property	are	assumed	to	have	been	good	for	investment	conditions’	(WIR	2003:	112-3).	The	problem	is	that	foreign	investor	rights	and	ISDS	sometimes	impose	‘too	much	control	over	the	sovereign	discretion	to	limit	the	enjoyment	of	private	property	in	the	public	interest’	(2003:	112-3;	1999:	134).	This	can	create	moral	hazard,	regulatory	chill,	and	limit	states	measures	necessary	to	turn	FDI	into	development	(WIR	2003:	112,	111-3,	145).	According	to	the	2003	report,	‘[t]he	tension	is	obvious.	Too	much	policy	space	reduces	the	value	of	international	obligations.	Too	stringent	obligations	overly	constrain	the	national	policy	space.	Finding	a	development-oriented	balance	is	the	challenge’	(WIR	2003:	171).		The	WIRs	suggest	increasing	international	cooperation	to	face	this	challenge,	but	they	also	admit	that	this	will	not	be	easy	because	most	international	cooperation	until	2003	focused	on	signing	IIAs	(WIR	2003:	172;	see	also	WIR	1996:	163-165;	WIR	2002:	8).	The	challenge	includes	an	emerging	global	demand	for	development	with	a	‘human	face’	(WIR	1999:	369-370);	‘the	ever	increasing	and	changing	conception	of	property	rights	and,	in	particular,	of	the	social	function	of	property;’	(WIR	2003:	111)	and	‘whether	the	rules	of	expropriation	or	other	standards	of	protection	...	are	the	best	way	to	offer	some	protection	to	investors	while	preserving	the	right	to	regulate’	(WIR	2003:	112).			
2.5.	Epilogue	Part	2:		The	first	thirteen	WIRs	shaped	a	narrative	of	TNCs	and	FDI	that,	in	many	ways,	promoted	a	global	commodity	conception	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Firstly,	the	WIRs	allocate	TNCs,	states	and	local	communities	clear	roles	and	functions.	From	the	three,	the	most	important	are	TNCs	as	catalytic	agents	of	development.	This	is	not	surprising	as	the	WIRs	discuss	and	promote	a	TNC-assisted	restructuring.	In	the	narrative	of	the	early	reports,	TNCs	are	capable	of	triggering	an	economic,	cultural	and	social	transformation.	These	reports,	however,	are	ambivalent	about	whether	this	transformation	is	inevitable	—i.e.	something	countries	need	to	catch	up	with—	or	it	is	the	outcome	of	a	series	of	policy	choices.25	Secondly,	a	TNC-assisted	development	model	transforms	states	in	a	crucial	manner.	On	the	one	hand,	states	have	the	task	to	establish	a	market-
																																																								25	See	Fredriksson	(n	2)	15-9;	Sauvant	(n	2)	59.		
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enabling	environment	to	face	the	fierce	competition	for	FDI.26	As	they	become	facilitators	of	FDI,	this	new	role	changes	their	relationship	with	TNCs.	This	relationship	is	now	framed	in	transaction	terms.	TNCs	have	increasing	ability	to	bargain	for	property	rights,	i.e.	to	ask	states	and	local	communities	to	adjust	to	their	corporate	expectations,	and	states	also	need	to	negotiate	with	TNCs	different	ways	to	maximise	the	benefits	of	FDI.	For	all	these	reasons,	the	reports	note	that	governments	need	to	be	good	negotiators	because	the	risks	of	excessive	incentives	are	serious.	On	the	other	hand,	states	have	to	regulate	FDI	because	TNCs	are	not	fully	development-friendly.	The	WIRs	highlight	that	regulation	should	be	the	result	of	a	rational-economic	process	to	increase	the	development	impact	of	FDI;	governments	should	be	cautious	and	avoid	interfering	with	markets.	As	an	alternative,	the	1994	and	1999	reports	introduce	CSR.		Lastly,	the	WIRs	describe	IIAs	as	congenial	to	a	market-enabling	environment.	These	treaties	limit	any	state	attempt	to	undo	reforms,	giving	a	positive	signal	to	markets.	But	it	turns	out	that	the	transformation	promoted	in	the	1990s	was	not	as	successful	as	some	anticipated.	In	the	following	years,	as	a	result,	the	approach	to	public	regulation	would	gradually	change,	and	the	emphasis	would	shift	to	the	need	to	strike	the	right	balance	between	foreign	investor	rights	and	public	regulation.	Particularly	in	the	2003	report,	IIAs	and	ISDS	begin	to	be	described	as	serious	obstacles	to	striking	this	regulatory	balance.	
	
3.	Consolidating	TNC-Assisted	Restructuring	(2004-2011)	The	2004-2011	WIRs	highlight	the	importance	of	FDI	and	discuss	some	problems	in	specific	sectors.	These	reports	move	the	focus	from	a	macro	to	a	sectoral	analysis.	The	early	WIRs	referred	to	topics	such	as	TNCs	and	employment,	TNCs	and	competitiveness,	and	TNCs	and	development.	In	contrast,	the	2004-2011	WIRs	deal	with	FDI	in	specific	sectors:	such	as	services,	research	and	technology,	extractive	industries,	infrastructure,	agriculture,	and	low	carbon.	All	these	reports	follow	a	similar	structure.	First,	they	focus	on	the	potential	benefits	of	TNC	participation	and	on	a	country’s	effort	to	attract	FDI.	Second,	they	review	and	analyse	the	various	contractual	and	policy	options	for	states	to	maximise	the	benefits	and	minimise	the	costs	of	FDI,	including	the	role	of	IIAs	and	the	implications	of	increasing	ISDS	cases.		The	underlying	narrative	of	these	WIRs	is	that	FDI	in	the	covered	sectors	can	promote	development.	In	each	sector,	however,	there	are	some	reasons	for	concern	that	make	FDI	more	or	less	desirable	depending	on	the	sector	and	country	conditions.	The	reports	recognise	these	problems	and	call	for	more	public	regulation,	better	government	bargaining	with	TNCs,	and	state	efforts	to	reap	the	benefits	of	FDI.27																																																										26	‘The	message	conveyed	underlined	the	importance	of	domestic	enterprise	development	and	the	need	to	‘work	with	the	market’	and	create	the	necessary	conditions,	coupled	with	proactive	government	intervention,	to	induce	TNCs	to	forge	local	linkages	and	establish	export	platforms	with	a	high	local	value	added.’	Fredriksson	(n	2)	25.	Similarly,	Moran	(n	2)	103-4.			27	ibid	105-10.	
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This	narrative	does	not	oppose	the	fundamental	claims	made	in	the	1991-2003	WIRs.	There	is	however	a	less	cautious	approach	towards	public	regulation	as	a	way	to	deal	with	the	risks	and	costs	of	FDI.	This	view	is	strengthened	by	the	2008	global	economic	crisis,	but	faces	the	chilling	effects	of	IIAs	and	ISDS.	Against	this	background,	the	WIRs	show	mixed	opinions	about	IIAs.	On	the	one	hand,	they	appear	as	tools	necessary	to	limit	protectionism	and	overregulation,	an	objective	which	enjoys	increasing	approval	as	developing	countries	raise	their	exports	of	capital	(WIR	2006:	228-9).	On	the	other	hand,	the	reports	seem	concerned	about	the	rising	number	of	ISDS	cases	and	the	excessive	costs	of	protection.	By	the	end	of	this	period,	the	WIRs	make	a	case	for	the	reorientation	of	IIAs,	but	remain	optimistic	about	their	potential	to	facilitate	FDI.		The	first	section	of	part	3	deals	with	the	sectoral	findings	of	the	WIRs.	The	second	section	examines	the	increasing	importance	of	public	regulation	as	a	counterweight	to	many	of	the	problems	identified	by	the	reports.	The	third	section	looks	at	investment	bargains	in	the	context	of	the	transactional	paradigm	of	TNC-host	state	relations.	The	fourth	section	explores	the	role	of	IIAs	and	the	increasing	backlash	against	the	international	investment	regime.				
	
3.1.	A	Sectoral	Approach	to	TNC-Assisted	Restructuring	The	2004-2011	WIRs	continue	underscoring	the	importance	of	FDI	for	development,	and	look	at	the	correlation	between	FDI	and	development	in	a	series	of	sectoral	analyses.	The	reports	highlight	the	benefits	of	attracting	FDI,	including	local	facilities,	jobs,	human	resource	training,	salary	increases,	integration	to	GVCs,	and	technology	transfers	(WIR	2004:	124;	WIR	2006:	183).	They	also	focus	on	the	challenges.	At	heart,	this	is	‘how	to	maximize	the	development	benefits	of	TNC	participation	...,	while	minimizing	the	costs’	(WIR	2009:	191,	190-2;	WIR	2006:	220;	WIR	2010:	157-8).		In	relation	to	the	service	sector,	the	2004	report	notes	that	‘TNCs	in	services	are	now	seen	to	transfer	new	technology,	if	‘technology’	is	defined	broadly	to	include	organizational,	managerial,	information	processing	and	other	skills	and	knowledge’	(WIR	2004:	124).	But	foreign	involvement	in	some	areas,	like	water,	electricity	and	media,	may	create	problems	for	governments	and	local	communities.	These	are	not	arguments	against	liberalising	services.	The	answer	is	not	to	remain	closed	but	to	open	gradually	and	enforce	market	supervision	(WIR	2004:	186-7).	Similarly,	the	2005	report	remarks	the	importance	of	FDI	in	research	and	development,	recommending	countries	to	promote	FDI	in	this	sector	actively.	‘One	of	the	main	reasons	why	developing	countries	promote	inward	FDI	is	indeed	to	link	up	to	the	global	technology	and	innovation	networks	led	by	[TNCs]’	(WIR	2005:	99).	This	WIR,	however,	also	warns	states	against	excessive	competition,	over-generous	incentives,	and	lowering	regulatory	standards	(WIR	2005:	191-3).		When	analysing	the	extractive	sector,	the	WIRs	examine	the	experience	of	developing	countries	in	the	1990s.	The	2007	report	notes	that	TNCs	can	provide	‘capital	and	foreign	exchange,	technical	and	managerial	
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capabilities,	and	access	to	markets	and	distribution	channels’	(WIR	2007:	129).	At	the	same	time,	it	explains	that	countries	‘that	had	previously	nationalized	the	mining	industry	had	to	convince	foreign	companies	that	new	investments	would	not	meet	the	same	fate’	(WIR	2007:	161).	In	the	1990s,	this	led	to	overgenerous	incentives	and	regulatory	conditions,	which	were	‘introduced	without	the	necessary	safeguards	for	securing	long-term	development	objectives’	(WIR	2007:	162).		The	analysis	of	FDI	in	infrastructure	concludes	with	similar	reservations.	The	2008	WIR	underscores	that	infrastructure	is	key	to	promote	economic	development,	in	particular,	as	it	serves	to	attract	FDI	(WIR	2008:	88-9;	141-3).	The	same	report,	on	the	other	hand,	notes	that	the	privatisation	of	some	services,	like	water	provision,	may	create	problems	(WIR	2008:	88-9,	141-3).	This	includes	the	impossibility	of	interrupting	the	service	in	case	of	non-payment.	The	2008	WIR	concludes	that	‘the	questions	surrounding	investment	by	private	companies	(including	TNCs)	in	infrastructure	activities	are	more	far-reaching	than	in	most	other	industries,	and	touch	on	the	economic,	social	and	political	spheres’	(WIR	2008:	89,	149-50).	The	2009	WIR	provides	mixed	views	regarding	FDI	in	agriculture.	It	discourages	large-land	acquisitions	because	they	may	create	social	tensions,	but	promotes	contractual	arrangements	between	TNCs	and	local	producers.	This	WIR	suggests	that	‘[t]his	mode	of	TNC	involvement	can	significantly	contribute	to	raising	agricultural	production	and	productivity,	and	to	economic	development	in	general’	(WIR	2009:	191,	190-2;	172-6).	While	admitting	tensions	regarding	water	and	domestic	food	supply,	the	2009	report	notes	that	TNCs	can	play	an	important	role	improving	the	productivity	of	local	farmers	by	transferring	technology,	monitoring	agricultural	production,	and	integrating	local	farmers	in	GVCs	(WIR	2009:	169-70,	171-6,	190-2).		The	2010	and	2011	WIRs	focus	on	FDI	in	the	low	carbon	economy	and	non-equity	forms,	providing	a	quite	optimistic	view	in	these	less	traditional	sectors.	These	reports	suggest	that	TNCs	can	make	a	major	contribution	to	the	transition	to	a	low	carbon	economy	(WIR	2010:	100),	and	that	non	equity-forms	of	FDI	can	be	fundamental	for	development	(WIR	2011:	165-9).	The	advantage	of	non-equity	forms	is	that	the	legal	title	of	the	assets	remains	in	the	hands	of	the	host	state	or	the	local	community.	This	could	minimise	the	loss	of	control	identified	in	the	previous	WIRs	(WIR	2011:	171-2;	WIR	2008:	25).			
3.2.	An	Investor-Friendly	and	Sound	Regulatory	Environment		In	view	of	this	sectoral	diagnosis,	the	narrative	of	the	WIRs	focuses	on	building	an	investor-friendly	and	a	sound	regulatory	environment	(WIR	2004:	191-4).	On	the	one	hand,	the	WIRs	underscore	the	importance	‘to	develop	and	maintain	a	governance	framework	based	on	the	rule	of	law,	and	supporting	institutions	that	provide	an	environment	in	which	companies	have	incentives	to	invest	in	productive	activities’	(WIR	2007:	158,	157-8).	This	requires	promoting	and	protecting	foreign	investor	rights,	a	contractual	culture,	the	consistency	and	constancy	of	policies,	
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management	control,	and	the	ability	to	predetermine	tax	liability	and		environment	regulations	(WIR	2007:	124-5).	The	2008	WIR	explains	that	‘[c]lear,	transparent	and	well-enforced	rules	of	conduct,	grounded	in	law,	are	important	for	reducing	the	risk	of	political	or	popular	backlashes	against	projects’	(WIR	2008:	150-2).	On	the	other	hand,	the	WIRs	integrate	this	TNC-friendly	view	of	regulation	with	some	of	the	sectoral	findings.	They	suggest	a	conception	of	public	regulation	that	combines	a	market-enabling	environment	with	economically	efficient	regulatory	systems	(WIR	2008:	150).	Countries	are	required	to	‘integrate	their	specific	policies	[including	FDI	policies]	into	an	overall	development	strategy,	specifying	the	role	they	can	play	in	national	economic	development’	(WIR	2007:	158).	The	WIRs	make	several	suggestions	in	this	respect.	In	the	context	of	agriculture,	for	instance,	FDI	requires	first	formalising	land	titles	to	protect	local	landowners	(WIR	2009:	190).	The	approach	is	similar	in	infrastructure,	where	the	report	notes	that	‘[i]f	potentially	competitive	segments	are	not	unbundled	or	if	the	service	provider	is	protected	from	competitive	pressures,	it	is	difficult	to	create	the	necessary	incentives	for	cost	control,	pricing	and	enhanced	performance	and,	ultimately,	investments’	(WIR	2008:	91-2).		The	WIRs	highlight	that	implementing	economically	efficient	regulatory	systems	should	be	states’	first	priority.	‘A	strong	regulatory	agency	can	be	a	useful	counterweight	to	political	opportunism	as	well	as	to	opportunistic	investors’	(WIR	2008:	151,	150-2).	In	some	sectors,	the	reports	recommend	creating	these	agencies	first,	and	only	later	liberalise	FDI	flows.	‘Unless	credible	regulatory	bodies	can	be	established,	most	developing	countries	are	likely	to	be	better	off	keeping	their	utilities	in	the	public	domain,	in	particular	the	profitable	ones’	(WIR	2008:	151).	Although	the	WIRs	did	not	change	their	narrative	about	the	benefits	of	integrating	into	the	global	economy,	the	global	economic	crisis	of	2008	strengthened	the	case	for	public	regulation	(WIR	2009:	35-6).	In	this	regard,	UNCTAD	is	convinced	that	when	it	comes	to	FDI		a	win-win	situation	can	emerge	if	the	institutional	arrangements	are	carefully	designed,	and	if	the	legislative	framework	and	investment	contracts	ensure	a	fair	sharing	of	the	benefits	between	host	countries	and	foreign	investors	(WIR	2009:	191,	189-91).		
3.3.	A	Fair	Transactional	Paradigm:	Striking	Equitable	Investment	
Bargains	The	WIRs	of	this	period	note	that	countries	can	reach	a	better	balance	in	FDI	matters	by	improving	their	bargaining	capacity	with	TNCs.	For	the	reports,	‘arrangements	reflect	an	ongoing	process	through	which	governments	seek	to	find	the	appropriate	balance	between	the	rights	and	obligations	of	the	State	on	the	one	hand,	and	TNCs	on	the	other’	(WIR	2007:	159,	156-62).	Investment	bargains	can	enable	countries	to	‘maximize	the	contribution	of	FDI	to	sustainable	agricultural	and	rural	development’	(WIR	2009:	172).	But	this	faces	two	problems.	First,	the	existing	competition	to	attract	FDI	hinders	the	ability	of	states	to	reach	fairer	deals.	
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Second,	this	requires	improving	state	capacity	to	negotiate	given	that	TNCs	often	have	more	information	and	knowledge	than	governments.		The	WIRs	remark	that	there	are	contracts	behind	privatisations,	concessions	and	renegotiations,	and	states	have	to	pay	attention	to	the	specific	commitments	they	provide	to	TNCs,	guaranteeing	‘consistency,	coherence	and	efficiency’	(WIR	2004:	189;	WIR	2009:	172-6;	WIR	2011:	171-2).	In	relation	to	the	extractive	and	infrastructure	sectors,	the	reports	note	that	the	‘effect	of	a	given	contract	[i.e.	of	an	investment]	is	determined	by	its	content,	which	is	based	on	negotiations	between	the	State	...	and	the	investor’	(WIR	2007:	159;	WIR	2008:	159).	Many	TNCs	contract	for	property	and	specific	control	rights	to	account	for	their	concrete	needs	in	each	project.	‘Indeed,	TNCs	may	have	an	interest	in	negotiating	a	contractual	arrangement	that	shifts	as	much	of	the	risks	as	possible	to	the	host	country	government’	(WIR	2008:	160).		For	the	2007	WIR,	‘[a]ll	this	implies	the	need	for	considerable	negotiating	skills	on	the	part	of	governments	to	ensure	a	satisfactory	outcome’	(WIR	2007:	159).	But	this	is	a	challenge	in	the	extractive,	infrastructure	and	other	sectors	as	TNCs	often	have	better	information	and	more	market	power	than	states.	These	firms	have	‘better	quality	and	up-to-date	maps,	as	well	as	satellite	images	and	other	remote	sensing	techniques,	and	sophisticated	computer	hardware	and	software	for	environmental	data	gathering,	analysis	and	display’	(WIR	2007:	159).	Similarly,	‘TNCs	in	infrastructure	are	often	large	relative	to	the	size	of	developing-economy	enterprises	and	can	wield	considerable	power,	potentially	of	a	monopolistic	nature’	(WIR	2008:	143).	In	addition,	these	firms	add	‘an	extra	layer	of	complexity	to	the	regulatory	regime	and	to	the	burden	of	the	regulatory	authorities’	(WIR2008:	143).	For	instance,	they	often	have	the	greatest	experts	because	the	best	public	servants	migrate	to	the	private	sector.	The	situation,	in	this	way,	can	be	very	asymmetrical	giving	rise	to	a	‘reverse	obsolescing	bargain’	(WIR	2008:	143,	143-4,	159-61).			
	
3.4.	The	Role	of	IIAs:	A	Sectoral	and	a	General	Assessment		
3.4.1.	Enabling	and	Promoting	FDI:	Some	Caution	from	a	Sectoral	
Perspective			The	2004-2011	WIRs	approach	IIAs	from	a	sectoral	and	a	general	perspective.	The	2007-2009	reports	recognise	that	IIAs	can	promote	FDI	in	extractive	industries,	infrastructure	and	agriculture	by	adding	an	important	element	to	the	relationship	between	foreign	investors	and	host	countries	(WIR	2007:	159,	161;	WIR	2008:	162-4;	WIR	2009:	189).	In	the	low	carbon	sector	IIAs	and	ISDS	can	serve	to	‘enforcing	the	enabling	framework	that	had	influenced	a	particular	investment	decision’	(WIR	2010:	136).	The	2010	WIR	recommends	countries	to	harness	‘the	potential	of	IIAs	to	ensure	positive	climate	change	related	effects’	(WIR	2010:	137).		While	recognising	the	promotional	effects	of	IIAs,	the	WIRs	makes	some	reservations	when	focusing	on	specific	sectors.	They	warn	about	the	undesired	effects	of	IIAs	on	public	regulation.	The	reports	point	out	that	
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infrastructure	and	agriculture	are	socially	sensitive	sectors,	and	are	associated	with	higher	chances	of	state	involvement.	It	recommends	states,	therefore,	‘to	ensure	that	the	IIAs	they	enter	into	leave	them	with	sufficient	autonomy	to	regulate	infrastructure	projects	in	the	public	interest’	(WIR	2008:	162;	WIR	2009:	189).			
3.4.2.	Balancing	Is	Needed	in	the	IIAs	World	The	emerging	controversy	around	ISDS	in	the	mid-2000s	eclipsed	these	sectoral	recommendations.	The	2004-2011	WIRs	begin	by	noting	that	IIAs	and	ISDS	can	serve	to	facilitate	FDI.	They	have	a	positive	impact	on	the	regulatory	framework	‘as	they	can	help	mitigate	perceived	levels	of	risks’	(WIR	2004:	194;	WIR	2008:	88-9;	WIR	2009:	189).	They	may	not	attract	FDI	flows	directly,	as	the	previous	WIRs	clarify,	but	they	have	‘an	indirect	investment	promotional	effect	...	that	stems	primarily	from	the	protection	that	they	offer	to	foreign	investors’	(WIR	2010:	136).	IIAs	prompt	states	to	bring	national	laws	in	conformity	with	treaty	standards	and	inform	and	train	local	authorities	(WIR	2006:	30).	Similarly,	the	threat	of	arbitration	means	that	states	need	to	be	‘sensitive	to	actions	that	could	trigger	litigation’	(WIR	2005:	31).		At	the	same	time,	the	2008	WIR	notes	that	countries	ratified	IIAs	with	a	view	of	attracting	FDI,	but	‘there	is	some	concern	that	improved	protection	and	certainty	for	foreign	investors	has	come	at	the	price	of	too	much	of	a	reduction	in	the	government’s	regulatory	flexibility’	(WIR	2008:	168;	WIR	2005:	30-1;	WIR	2006:	25-30;	WIR	2010:	136).	The	WIRs	observe	that	arbitrators	have	mainly	focused	‘on	the	rights	of	the	foreign	investors’	(WIR	2008:	168-9),	creating	situations	of	moral	hazard	and	regulatory	chill	(WIR2010:	83-90,	136-8,	157-8).	The	2006	report	mentions,	in	this	regard,	that	the	increasing	number	of	disputes	involving	developed	countries	‘might	reinforce	the	already	existing	trend	in	some	countries	(e.g.	Canada,	United	States)	to	refine	the	text	of	individual	BIT	articles	and	to	review	their	BIT	dispute	settlement	provisions’	(WIR	2006:	229).	The	2004-2011	WIRs	acknowledge	an	ongoing	‘discussion	on	what	should	be	the	proper	counterweight	to	investors’	rights	in	IIAs’	(WIR	2007:	19;	WIR	2008:	162-4;	WIR	2010:	83-90,	157-8).	This	discussion	sparked	a	new	treaty-drafting	trend	focused	on	clarifications,	general	exceptions,	prudential	carve-outs	and	CSR	(WIR	2005:	26-8;	WIR	2006:	25-30;	WIR	2009:	189-90;	WIR	2010:	82-90;	WIR	2011:	100-3).		For	the	2011	WIR,	‘achieving	a	balance	between	the	sovereign	right	to	regulate	an	industry,	and	the	need	to	avoid	investment	protectionism,	remains	a	major	policy	challenge’	(WIR	2011:	110,	107).	The	WIRs	of	this	period	end	with	an	optimistic	view	about	this	challenge.	In	the	wake	of	the	2008	global	economic	crisis,	they	admit	that	IIAs	have	an	important	task	in	limiting	protectionism,	but	also	note	that	they	should	allow	for	emergency	measures	in	response	to	the	crisis	(WIR	2009:	35-6).	The	2010	WIR	welcomes	‘certain	innovative	features	aimed	at	rebalancing	the	agreements	between	the	rights	and	obligations	of	investors	and	host	countries’	(WIR	2010:	82).	This	report	is	positive	about	the	possibility	of	reaching	‘a	globally	shared	view	on	the	way	forward	for	the	IIA	universe’	(WIR	2010:	
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90).	The	2011	report	is	also	optimistic	describing	the	moment	as	a	‘period	of	reflection	on	the	future	orientation	of	the	IIA	regime	to	make	it	work	better	for	sustainable	development’	(WIR	2011:	100).		
3.5.	Epilogue	Part	3:	The	WIRs	of	this	period	consolidate	the	TNC-assisted	restructuring	of	the	1990s,	while	making	a	clearer	case	in	favour	of	public	regulation	to	deal	with	public	challenges,	such	as	economic	crises,	human	rights	and	the	environment.	These	WIRs	engage	with	a	series	of	problems	and	conclude	that	more	public	regulation	can	be	the	counterweight	to	foreign	investor	rights.	This	shift	implies	a	more	protagonist	role	of	the	state	to	strike	the	right	regulatory	balance,	maximising	the	benefits	and	minimising	the	costs	of	FDI.	The	costs,	however,	are	still	described	as	negative	externalities	and	market	failures.28		In	this	context,	it	is	not	a	surprise	that	the	WIRs	focus	on	the	dual	nature	of	IIAs.	The	reports	confirm	that	IIAs	can	serve	to	facilitate	FDI	as	it	was	suggested	in	the	1990s.	They	are	positive	about	the	role	of	these	treaties	in	promoting	FDI	in	several	sectors,	such	as	the	low	carbon	economy.29	But	the	consolidation	of	TNC-assisted	restructuring	comes	with	the	conclusion	that	more	public	regulation	is	needed	(market	supervision	rules	are	not	enough),	and,	for	this	reason,	IIAs	and	ISDS	become	a	matter	of	increasing	concern.	The	growing	number	of	disputes	against	developed	states	indicates	that	the	problem	is	serious.	This	has	triggered	a	process	to	modernise	IIAs,	which	the	reports	approve	and	promote.		The	WIRs,	however,	identify	other	challenges	for	achieving	a	more	balanced	approach,	like	regulatory	capture	and	investor	opportunism.	In	particular,	they	recommend	states	to	strengthen	their	bargaining	skills.	The	reports	recognise	that	the	contribution	of	FDI	in	most	sectors	depends	on	the	initial	bargain	–	a	point	made	in	the	early	WIRs.	Governments	should	therefore	improve	their	bargaining	capacity.	But	this	suggestion	is	not	easy	to	implement	because	countries	face	increasing	competition	for	FDI,	and	TNCs	sometimes	have	more	information,	knowledge,	and	market	power	than	states.	This	bargaining	asymmetry	can	cause	a	‘reverse’	obsolescing	bargain,	which	means	that	those	who	may	become	prisoners	after	the	establishment	of	a	foreign	investment	are	host	countries	and	not	TNCs.		Crucially,	the	reform	narrative	in	these	WIRs	does	not	address	these	issues	directly.	It	does	not	tackle	the	indeterminacy	of	the	allocation	of	risks	after	the	establishment	of	foreign	investment.	The	policy	options	pay	little	attention	to	TNCs’	bargaining	power	and	local	vulnerabilities,	and	there	is	little	in	this	toolkit	to	cope	with	state	and	local	‘overdependence’	on	FDI.30	It	turns	out	that	the	narrative	of	this	period	shows	both	the																																																									28	See	Moran	(n	2)	97.			29	Many	countries	did	attract	FDI	in	the	low	carbon	economy,	and	a	good	number	of	those	investments	ended	up	in	ISDS	cases	after	Spain,	Italy	and	the	Czech	Republic	had	to	phase	out	the	incentives	due	to	financial	constraints.	30	See	Sanjaya	Lall,	‘Reinventing	industrial	strategy:	the	role	of	government	policy	in	building	industrial	competitiveness,’	(2004)	No	28	G-24	Discussion	Paper	Series	-	United	
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continuity	of	a	commodity	conception	of	foreign	investor	rights	as	well	as	an	increasing	consensus	for	a	kind	of	public	regulation	that	is	consistent	with	this	conception	of	property.31	This	regulation	needs	to	be	informed	by	a	rational	economic	analysis,	as	opposed	to	the	threats	to	propriety	or	local	community	values.32	The	expectation	that	TNCs	should	adjust	to	local	preferences	needs	to	be	disregarded	because,	otherwise,	this	could	affect	the	TNC-assisted	restructuring.		
	
4.	Reorienting	TNC-Assisted	Restructuring	(2012-2015)	The	2012-2015	WIRs	make	an	effort	to	reorient	foreign	investment	policies	by	adding	sustainability	to	the	notion	of	development.	This	follows	the	debate	around	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs)	in	the	United	Nations.33	The	idea	of	development	in	the	early	WIRs	is	closely	related	to	TNC-assisted	restructuring.	The	WIRs	insist	in	maximising	the	development	contribution	of	FDI,	i.e.	building	productive	capacity,	technology	transfer,	human	resource	development,	while	minimising	the	costs.	The	2012-2015	WIRs	innovate	in	this	respect	by	clarifying	that	the	goal	is	not	to	achieve	any	development	but	sustainable	and	inclusive	development.	UNCTAD’s	Investment	Policy	Framework	for	Sustainable	Development	(IPFSD)	is	a	proposal	for	a	new	generation	of	investment	policies,	with	the	purpose	of	encouraging	FDI	that	promotes	sustainable	development.	Although	the	WIRs	do	not	explore	in	detail	the	notions	of	sustainability	and	inclusiveness,	they	note	that	sustainability	refers	to	the	environment	and	the	rights	of	future	generations,	while	inclusive	growth	requires	growth	for	everybody	(WIR	2012:	101-02,	108).		In	this	context,	the	WIRs	of	this	period	do	two	things.	First,	they	renovate	the	commitment	to	TNC-assisted	restructuring.	The	2013	and	2014	WIRs	re-examine	two	key	topics	of	the	1990s.	The	2013	report	focuses	again	on	GVCs	and	their	fundamental	importance	for	most	developing	countries.	It	emphasises	the	increasing	connection	between	FDI	and	trade,	recommending	countries	to	engage	in	comprehensive	trade	and	investment	negotiations.	The	2014	report	focuses	on	FDI	contribution	to	SDGs.	It	presents	‘an	action	plan	to	bridge	the	SDG	investment	gap’	(WIR	2015:	213).	Second,	the	WIRs	introduce	a	proposal	to	reform	the	international	investment	regime.	The	2015	WIR	makes	a	comprehensive	proposal	that	‘advances	UNCTAD’s	earlier	work	on	this	matter,	in	particular	its	Investment	Policy	Framework	(WIR12),	the	reform	paths	for	investment	dispute	settlement	(WIR13)	and	the	reform	paths	for	IIA	reform	(WIR14)’	(WIR	2015:	171).	The	2015	report	also	puts	forward																																																																																																																																																															Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development,	27;	Ha-Joon	Chang,	‘Regulation	of	Foreign	Investment	in	Historical	Perspective,’	(2004)	16:3	EJDR	687,	712.		31	Sauvant	notes	that	since	the	1970s	the	debate	is	not	whether	or	not	to	regulate,	but	what	should	be	the	type	of	regulation	and	regulatory	framework	to	govern	foreign	investment.	Sauvant	(n	2)	15-8,	26.	Similarly,	Schneiderman	(note	23)	95.	32	These	threats	are	the	result	of	TNCs	becoming	‘directly	involved	in	the	production	process	and	the	social	fabric	of	their	host	countries.’	Sauvant	(n	2)	64-5.	33	See	UNCTAD,	Investment	Policy	Framework	(2015).	Available	at	http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/FINAL_WEB_POLICY_FRAMEWORK_30_NOV_2015.pdf	(last	visited	19	April	2017).	
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some	suggestions	for	coherent	international	tax	and	investment	policies	(WIR	2015:	206-7)		The	first	section	of	part	4	deals	with	the	WIRs’	renovated	efforts	to	emphasise	the	role	of	FDI	in	sustainable	development,	in	particular,	for	climbing	the	value	ladder	and	bridging	the	investment	gap.	The	second	section	analyses	the	attempt	to	balance	foreign	investor	rights	and	sustainable	development.	The	third	section	focuses	on	the	proposals	to	reform	IIAs	and	ISDS.						
4.1.	FDI	for	SDGs:	Climbing	the	Value	Ladder	and	Bridging	the	
Investment	Gap	Large	part	of	the	2012-2015	WIRs	focus	again	on	the	relationship	between	FDI	and	development,	with	special	attention	to	promoting	SDGs.	The	2015	WIR	concludes	by	noting	that	FDI	‘plays	an	important	role	in	financing	for	development	and	in	supporting	progress	towards	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals’	(WIR	2015:	213).	This	focus	on	FDI	and	development	resembles	the	early	1990s	WIRs,	but	the	narrative	of	this	period	is	based	on	UNCTAD’s	IPFSD.	This	policy	framework	is	based	on	three	key	premises:	1)	FDI	can	promote	growth,	jobs	and	development;	2)	countries	should	pursue	an	inclusive	growth	and	sustainable	development	agenda;	3)	governments	are	in	a	difficult	position	to	promote	responsible	investment	and,	at	the	same	time,	address	‘shortcomings	of	investment	policy	that	may	hamper	policy	effectiveness	and	risk	causing	uncertainty	for	investors’	(WIR	2012:	102).	Although	previous	WIRs	referred	to	sustainability,	this	issue	has	become	a	crucial	element	of	UNCTAD’s	recent	recommendations.	Countries	attract	FDI	to	achieve	sustainable	development,	and,	for	this	reason,	the	WIRs	promote	policies	to	target,	attract	and	enable	FDI	that	can	facilitate	this	goal.	The	reports	describe	a	new	generation	of	FDI	policies,	illustrating	this	trend	with	the	promotion	of	low	carbon	FDI	and	the	increasing	use	of	CSR	(WIR	2012:	100-1).	According	to	the	2012	WIR,	governments	are	‘pursuing	a	broader	and	more	intricate	development	policy	agenda	within	a	framework	that	seeks	to	maintain	a	generally	favourable	investment	climate’	(WIR	2012:	161).	When	it	comes	to	GVCs,	the	2013	WIR	reminds	the	reader	of	the	1993	report,	and	notes	that	‘since	around	2000,	global	trade	and	FDI	have	both	grown	exponentially,	significantly	outpacing	global	GDP	growth,	reflecting	the	rapid	expansion	of	international	production	in	TNC-coordinated	networks’	(WIR	2013:	122).	The	main	message	of	the	2013	WIR	is	that	—except	for	a	few	large	emerging	economies—	engaging	with	GVCs	is	no	longer	a	choice.	‘[T]he	key	question	for	most	countries	is	how	to	incorporate	GVCs	in	development	strategy’	(WIR	2013:	175,	172).	The	report	remarks	that	‘[t]he	optimal	policy	outcome	is	higher	GVC	participation	and	higher	domestic	value	added	creation’	(WIR	2013:	169;	122-3,	164,	167).		The	2013	WIR	dedicates	several	paragraphs	to	the	attraction	of	GVC-FDI.	It	highlights	that	‘TNC’s	decisions	on	where	to	locate	and	with	whom	to	partner	are	decisions	on	where	to	invest	and	from	where	to	trade’	(WIR	
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2013:	140).	Like	in	the	1990s,	the	key	is	to	provide	TNCs	with	a	conducive	investment	environment,	including	congenial	industrial	policies,	infrastructure,	productive	capacities,	and	trade	and	investment	policies	(WIR	2013:	176-80).	In	relation	to	the	latter,	it	is	worth	noting	that	this	WIR	encourages	countries	to	focus	on	a	trade	and	investment	agenda	(WIR	2013:	180).			The	2013	WIR	is	also	specific	about	the	risks	associated	with	GVCs	and	the	need	of	public	regulation.	These	include	social,	environmental,	tax-avoidance	and	labour	risks	(WIR	2013:	122,	157-63,	176).	Fundamentally,	the	report	warns	against	the	risk	that	‘[l]ocal	firms	may	find	themselves	locked	into	low	value	added	activities	despite	having	successfully	gone	through	product	and	process	upgrading,	because	functional	upgrading	is	more	difficult	to	achieve’	(WIR	2013:	169).	To	avoid	this,	the	report	says,	it	is	necessary	to	coordinate	a	joint	effort	of	the	private	and	public	sector,	where	states	are	mainly	responsible	for	infrastructure,	education	and	the	right	investment	environment	(WIR	2013:	146,	167,	176).	The	WIR	2014	is	dedicated	to	FDI	and	SDGs.	It	begins	by	noting	that	FDI	can	bridge	the	investment	gap	to	reach	SDGs,	but	that	this	requires	tackling	the	constraints	faced	by	foreign	investors.	These	include	entry	barriers	and	an	unwelcoming	investment	climate	(WIR	2014:	165-7).	The	main	problem	relates	to:		[i]nadequate	risk-return	ratios	for	SDG	investment.	Risks	related	to	SDG	investment	projects	can	occur	at	the	country	and	policy	level	(e.g.	legal	protection	for	investment);	at	the	market	or	sector	level	(e.g.	uncertain	demand);	and	at	the	project	(financial)	level	(WIR	2014:	165).	To	tackle	these	risks,	the	2014	WIR	recommends	states	to	take	promotional	measures	(WIR	2014:	165).	These	measures	should	include	establishing	a	‘sound	overall	policy	climate,	conducive	to	attracting	investment	while	safeguarding	public	interests,	especially	in	sensitive	sectors’	(WIR	2014:	166-7,	152).	Private-public	partnerships	and	investment	insurance	can	play	an	important	role	in	this	respect	(WIR	2014:	167-8).	Similarly,	the	report	is	optimistic	about	the	role	of	future	IIAs	in	the	promotion	of	SDG-related	FDI:	‘IIAs	could	do	more	and	also	promote	investment	in	SDGs	in	a	proactive	manner’	(WIR	2014:	181,	176,	186).		
4.2.	The	Attempt	to	Strike	a	Balance:	The	IPFSD	The	2012-2015	WIRs	promote	a	new	role	for	states	with	the	objective	to	turn	FDI	into	a	contribution	for	sustainable	development.	The	2012	report	provides	countries	with	guidance	on	how	to	face	this	challenge,	without	falling	in	the	temptation	of	protectionism	and	over-regulation.	It	begins	by	underscoring	a	different	context.	‘Governments	have	become	decidedly	less	reticent	in	regulating	and	steering	the	economy’	(WIR	2012:	100;	WIR	2013:	92;	WIR	2015:	127-8).	This	is	the	result	of	the	recognition	that	liberalization,	if	it	is	to	generate	sustainable	development	outcomes,	has	to	be	accompanied	—if	not	preceded—	by	the	establishment	of	proper	regulatory	and	institutional	
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frameworks.	The	key	policy	challenge	is	to	strike	the	right	balance	between	regulation	and	openness	(WIR2012:	101;	WIR2013:	92).	According	to	the	WIRs,	this	can	be	seen	at	two	levels.	First,	there	are	increasing	efforts	to	‘integrate	domestic	companies	into	GVCs’	(WIR	2012:	100).	Governments	focus	on	the	quality	—and	not	only	on	the	quantity—	of	investment.	Second,	states	aim	to	promote	sustainable	development,	targeting	environmental	and	social	objectives	(WIR	2013:	92).	This	new	policy	trend	‘reflects,	in	part,	a	renewed	realism	about	the	economic	and	social	costs	of	unregulated	market	forces’	(WIR	2012:	100).	These	new	policies,	the	reports	note,	have	become	part	of	the	‘mainstream’	(WIR	2012:	102).	Societies	are	asking	for	TNCs	that	respect	CSR	standards,	and	for	FDI	that	is	‘not	harmful	for	the	environment,	...	brings	social	benefits,	promotes	gender	equality,	and	...	helps	them	to	move	up	the	global	value	chain’	(WIR	2015:	127).	The	new	policy	context,	however,	poses	some	challenges	for	FDI	governance.	It	‘gives	rise	to	concerns	that	an	accumulation	of	regulatory	activities	may	gradually	increase	the	risk	of	over-regulation	or	investment	protectionism	that	hinders	inward	and	outward	FDI’	(WIR	2012:	100).	UNCTAD	responds	to	this	challenge	with	a	new	investment	policy	agenda:	the	IPFSD.	The	IPFSD	‘provides	a	point	of	reference	and	a	common	language	for	debate	and	cooperation	on	national	and	international	investment	policies’	(WIR2012:	162,	161-2).	The	main	characteristic	of	the	IPFSD	is	that	it	promotes	a	reorientation	of	—and	not	a	rupture	with—	existing	policies.	FDI	remains	a	fundamental	means	to	economic	growth,	but	this	growth	now	needs	to	be	sustainable	and	inclusive	(WIR	2012:	107-8).	 To	achieve	this	goal,	the	IPFSD	aims	to	strike	a	balance	between	‘investment	regulation	and	corporate	governance’	and	‘openness,	protection	and	promotion’	(WIR	2012:	110).	But	the	unresolved	tension	between	these	goals	underlies	this	policy	framework.	The	IPFSD	advances	the	rule	of	law	for	everybody,	clarifying	that	institutions	should	ensure	a	‘predictable,	efficient	and	transparent	procedures	for	investors’	(WIR	2012:	107).	It	calls	for	‘flexibility	to	adapt	to	changing	circumstances,	while	recognizing	that	a	favourable	investment	climate	requires	stability	and	predictability’	(WIR	2012:	108).	It	also	invites	countries	to	revise	policies	that	do	not	promote	sustainable	development,	but	warns	of	the	limitations	imposed	by	the	competition	to	attract	FDI	(WIR	2012:	108).			
4.3.	IIAs	and	ISDS:	The	Main	Obstacles	to	Striking	the	Right	
Balance?			
4.3.1.	An	Increasing	Need	for	Reform	Although	the	IPFSD	takes	a	rather	comprehensive	approach	to	FDI	governance,	the	2013-2015	WIRs	focus	essentially	on	IIAs	and	ISDS.	The	importance	of	host	state-TNC	bargaining	in	many	areas	and	sectors	is	not	addressed	directly.	By	the	end	of	the	2000s,	UNCTAD	had	listed	a	number	of	issues	related	to	foreign	investment	protection,	but	still	seemed	
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optimistic	about	the	reorientation	of	the	treaties.	The	2013-2015	WIRs	show	more	concern	about	the	effects	of	IIAs	and	ISDS,	and	are	more	explicit	about	the	need	for	reform.	This	reform	should	aim	at	making	IIAs	coherent	with	sustainable	development.	The	focus	on	IIAs	and	development	is	not	new,	but	the	new	challenge	is	sustainability.	The	WIRs	do	not	promote	a	radical	revision	of	IIAs.	They	continue	to	highlight	the	importance	of	IIAs	for	TNC-assisted	restructuring.	According	to	the	2012	report,	‘IIAs	complement	national	rules	and	regulations	by	offering	additional	assurances	to	foreign	investors	concerning	the	protection	of	their	investments’	(WIR	2012:	133).	The	2015	WIR	similarly	concludes	that	‘IIAs	can	help	improve	countries’	regulatory	and	institutional	frameworks,	including	by	adding	an	international	dimension	to	them	and,	by	promoting	the	rule	of	law	and	enhancing	good	governance’	(WIR	2015:	125,	125-6).		For	the	WIRs,	however,	foreign	investment	protection	has	been	excessive	in	some	cases,	while	IIAs	have	been	underused	as	a	promotional	tool	(WIR	2013:	107;	WIR	2014:	126-32;	WIR	2015:	126).	The	2012	report	recognises	that	the	‘strength	of	IIAs	in	granting	protection	to	foreign	investors	has	become	increasingly	evident,’	but	notes	that	‘ISDS	claims	can	be	used	by	foreign	investors	in	unanticipated	ways’	challenging	measures	adopted	in	the	public	interest	(WIR2012:	136).	Similarly,	this	report	notes	that	investment	protection	is	particularly	needed	by	‘developing	countries	with	the	most	unfavourable	risk	ratings,’	but	also	admits	that	generally	these	countries	are	‘also	most	in	need	of	flexibility	(or	policy	space)	for	specific	development	policies’	(WIR	2012:	133-4).	To	these	problems,	the	WIRs	add	that	IIAs	are	being	underused	as	an	‘an	instrument	for	sustainable	development	objectives’	(WIR	2015:	126).		The	WIRs	highlight	that	this	call	for	reform	is	shared	by	most	countries.	For	the	first	time	in	twenty-five	years,	the	2015	report	looks	at	the	history	of	the	IIAs	in	some	detail,	although	it	does	not	engage	with	the	neo-colonial	origin	of	this	regime.	The	reason	for	this	historical	account	is	to	emphasise	the	importance	of	regulation	and	the	current	period	of	reorientation	in	the	treaties	(WIR	2015:	121-5).	The	WIRs	recognise	that	‘the	IIA	regime	is	going	through	a	period	of	reflection,	review	and	revision’	(WIR	2015:	120;	WIR	2014:	126).	This	is	a	result	of	new	state	attitudes	towards	sustainable	development	and	ISDS	risks,	which	implies	the	increasing	dissatisfaction	with	the	protection	of	foreign	investment	at	the	expense	of	public	goals.	The	WIRs	note,	in	this	respect,	that	‘countries	with	sound	and	credible	domestic	legal	systems	and	stable	investment	climates’	are	reaching	similar	opinions	regarding	IIAs	and	ISDS	(WIR	2012:	134,	86-8;	WIR	2015:	120).		This	positive	context	for	the	reorientation	of	the	international	investment	regime,	the	WIRs	explains,	faces	some	limitations.	Most	importantly,	it	is	counterbalanced	by	the	need	of	many	countries	to	attract	FDI,	which	results	in	a	‘wait	and	see’	approach	(WIR	2014:	126,	126-32).	These	limitations	also	respond	to	the	complexities	of	the	legal	issues	before	investment	tribunals.	ISDS	‘exposes	host	States	to	additional	legal	and	financial	risks,	often	unforeseen	at	point	of	entering	into	the	IIA	and	in	circumstances	beyond	clear-cut	infringements	on	private	property’	
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(WIR2015:	128).	At	the	same	time,	the	reports	recognise	that	investment	disputes	are	increasingly	complex,	‘raising	difficult	legal	questions	about	the	borderline	between	permitted	regulatory	activities	of	the	State	and	illegal	interference	with	investor	rights	for	which	compensation	has	to	be	paid’	(WIR	2015:	124;	WIR	2012:	136).				
4.3.2.	Systemic	or	Limited	Reform?		The	WIRs	make	some	specific	recommendations	regarding	reform.	The	2014	report	identifies	four	modes	of	state	engagement	with	the	international	investment	regime:	1)	maintaining	the	status	quo,	2)	disengaging	from	the	regime,	3)	introducing	selective	adjustments,	and	4)	undertaking	systematic	reform	(WIR	2014:	126-32).	Building	on	previous	work,	the	2015	WIR	presents	a	proposal	focused	on	five	goals.	These	goals	are	‘safeguarding	the	right	to	regulate	for	pursuing	sustainable	development	objectives,	reforming	investment	dispute	settlement,	promoting	and	facilitating	investment,	ensuring	responsible	investment,	and	enhancing	systemic	consistency’	(WIR	2015:	120,	164-6,	171).	According	to	the	reports,	these	specific	goals	can	be	achieved	by	clarifying	treaties,	including	general	exceptions	and	carve	outs,	reforming	ISDS,	minimising	the	existing	treaty	fragmentation,	and	by	incorporating	CSR	standards	(WIR	2012:	107-10,	135-6;	WIR	2013:	102-3,	107;	WIR	2014:	126-32;	WIR	2015:	136-45).		Against	this	background,	the	WIRs	are	not	entirely	satisfied	with	the	negotiations	during	this	period.	To	a	positive	evaluation	of	the	treaty-drafting	trend	in	2013	(WIR	2013:	102),	the	2014	report	opposes	a	less	optimistic	view	because	‘IIA	reform	efforts	have	...	been	relatively	modest’	(WIR	2014:	126).	WIRs	were	optimistic	because	the	negotiation	of	FTAs	created	opportunities	‘to	rationalize	the	regime	and	create	a	more	coherent,	manageable	and	development-oriented	set	of	investment	policies’	(WIR	2013:	105).	But	the	reports	observe	that	countries	are	creating	a	multiplication	of	treaty	layers	‘even	more	complex	and	prone	to	overlap	and	inconsistency’	(WIR	2013:	105;	WIR	2014:	121-3).	These	WIRs	conclude	that	the	only	solution	is	to	increase	multilateral	cooperation	and	work	towards	common	shared	values	and	goals	about	business	and	development	(WIR	2013:	107;	WIR	2014:	130;	WIR	2015:	120,	170).		Nevertheless,	the	WIRs	are	ambivalent	about	promoting	a	systemic	reform.	The	reports	consider	every	alternative,	including	terminating	IIAs,	but	are	rather	cautious	when	it	comes	to	concrete	policy	advice.	The	WIRs	justify	this	position	because	countries	could	give	a	negative	signal	to	TNCs.	In	the	current	context	where	countries	need	to	‘demonstrate	their	continued,	constructive	engagement	with	the	investment	regime’,	the	2014	report	notes	that	‘introducing	selective	adjustments	in	new	agreements	may	appear	as	an	appealing	—if	not	the	most	realistic—	option	for	reducing	the	mounting	pressure	on	IIAs’	(WIR	2014:	129,	130).	The	2015	report	explains	that	ideally	countries	should	engage	in	a	reform	according	to	the	IPFSD,	but	this	option	may	‘be	perceived	as	reducing	the	protective	value	of	the	agreements	and	offering	a	less	attractive	investment	climate’	(WIR	2015:	131).	Similarly,	this	report	welcomes	renegotiations	with	
Final	Draft	–	Forthcoming	in	The	Journal	of	World	Investment	&	Trade	
 27 
treaty	parties,	but	warns	that	‘treaty	denunciation	done	without	consulting	the	other	contracting	party	risks	negatively	affecting	foreign	relations’	(WIR	2015:	130).	The	WIRs	recommend,	in	short,	to	engage	in	‘[l]limited,	i.e.	selective,	adjustments’	(WIR	2015:	130).		These	selective	adjustments	mainly	refer	to	the	ISDS	and	the	IIAs.	In	relation	to	ISDS,	the	2013	WIR	recognises	that	‘[t]he	ISDS	mechanism	was	designed	to	depoliticize	investment	disputes	and	create	a	forum	that	would	offer	investors	a	fair	hearing	before	an	independent,	neutral	and	qualified	tribunal’	(WIR	2013:	111).	However,	there	are	serious	concerns	regarding	its	legitimacy,	transparency,	consistency,	erroneous	awards,	arbitrator	impartiality,	and	high	costs.	This	report	proposes	five	paths	for	reforming	the	ISDS.	They	include	1)	promoting	ADR	mechanisms;	2)	tailoring	the	system	through	IIAs;	3)	limiting	investors	access	to	ISDS,	4)	the	establishment	of	an	appeal	facility;	and	5)	the	creation	of	a	permanent	court	(WIR	2013:	111-2).	Regarding	the	content	of	IIAs,	the	WIRs	envision	a	reform	where	‘flexibility	mechanisms	do	not	erode	a	principal	objective	of	IIAs	–	their	potential	investment-enhancing	effect’	(WIR	2012:	136;	WIR	2015:	125-6).	‘IIA	reform	needs	to	ensure	that	countries	retain	their	right	to	regulate	for	pursuing	public	policy	interests,	including	sustainable	development	objectives’	(WIR2015:	128).	At	the	same	time,	the	reform	of	MFN,	FET,	indirect	expropriation,	the	incorporation	of	exceptions	and	CSR	should	not	increase	‘investors’	perception	of	country	risk	and	susceptibility	to	opportunistic	regulatory	behaviour’	(WIR	2015	139,	136-45;	WIR	2012:	135-6).	While	the	concrete	balance	depends	on	each	country’s	‘preferences	and	policies’	(WIR	2015:	131),	the	2015	reports	suggest	that:		[c]are	needs	to	be	taken	that	individual	reform	steps	or	the	cumulative	effects	of	a	whole	reform	package	do	not	deprive	the	IIA	of	its	investment	protection	function,	but	rather	achieve	a	balance	between	the	foreign	investors’	adequate	protection	and	the	host	countries’	need	to	preserve	sufficient	regulatory	space	(WIR	2015:	131).		
	
4.4.	Epilogue	part	4:	The	reformist	approach	of	the	2012-2015	WIRs	is	inspired	by	the	need	for	sound	public	regulation.	This	view	became	dominant	after	the	2008	global	economic	crisis.	I	suggested	earlier	that	this	reorientation	is	consistent	with	a	global	commodity	conception	of	property.	At	first	glance,	the	2012-2015	WIRs	could	be	pointing	in	a	different	direction.	They	appear	to	swing	between	a	justification	for	economically	efficient	regulation	and	a	shift	in	the	nature	of	development.	Sustainability	and	inclusive	growth	are	key	concepts	in	the	IPFSD,	although	inclusive	growth	disappears	in	the	next	reports.	These	two	concepts,	in	any	case,	do	not	point	in	any	clear	direction.	Sustainability	can	be	used	as	a	justification	for	regulating	FDI	negative	externalities	or	for	promoting	a	model	shaped	according	to	local	preferences.	The	2012-2015	WIRs	suggest	the	former.	They	do	not	propose	to	rethink	the	notion	of	development	but	to	‘ensure	the	continued	
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effectiveness’	of	TNC-assisted	restructuring	in	light	of	the	disenchantment	with	IIAs	and	ISDS	(See	in	particular	WIR	2015:	213).		The	IPFSD	promotes	a	new	role	for	states	in	the	global	economy	but	the	fundamental	question	is	which	role.	The	most	important	change	refers	to	the	state	steering	role	of	the	economy.	This	role	was	discouraged	in	the	1990s	but	reappears	in	2010s	WIRs.	When	we	look	at	the	WIRs	more	closely,	however,	this	steering	role	should	serve	mainly	to	target	FDI,	create	linkages,	climb	the	value	ladder,	and	address	negative	externalities.	This	is	not	very	different	from	the	1990s	policy	advice.	A	GVC-development	path	is	controlled	by	TNCs,	and	climbing	the	value	ladder	—as	the	WIRs	note—	depends	on	TNC	decisions	and	the	right	public	policies.	The	reports	note	that	relying	on	GVCs	for	development	is	no	longer	an	alternative	for	many	developing	countries:	they	‘may	not	have	a	choice’	(WIR2013:	xi,	xxiv).34	This	does	not	mean	that	the	WIRs	discourage	states	from	regulating	and	minimising	the	costs	of	GVCs.	The	2015	report,	for	instance,	highlights	the	need	to	deal	with	tax	avoidance	(WIR	2015:	176).	It	turns	out,	however,	that	the	main	risk	for	countries	and	local	communities	is	to	be	unable	to	catch	up	with	the	global	market	and	remain	stranded	at	the	lower	ends	of	GVCs.	 	The	narrative	regarding	FDI	and	SDGs	is	similar.	Countries	should	turn	to	FDI	to	reach	SDGs,	and	therefore	governments	should	deal	with	entry	barriers	and	an	unwelcoming	investment	climate.	They	should	be	proactive	to	attract	this	type	of	FDI,	lowering	risks	and	making	projects	more	attractive	for	investors.	The	promotion	of	SDGs	requires	building	infrastructure	not	only	for	the	community	but	also	for	the	economy.	This	infrastructure	is	necessary	to	promote	the	engagement	with	GVCs,	reinforcing	the	overdependence	on	FDI.	It	is	not	entirely	clear,	in	this	context,	how	states	and	local	communities	could	improve	their	bargaining	power	to	reflect	their	own	vision	of	sustainable	development.		Again,	the	main	counterweight	to	the	problems	related	to	FDI	and	TNCs	is	regulation,	increasingly	public	regulation	and	other	measures	to	tackle	tax	avoidance.	But	the	crucial	question	is	which	kind	of	regulation	is	compatible	with	the	TNC-assisted	restructuring	of	host	states	and	local	communities.	The	increasing	importance	of	public	regulation	explains	why	the	WIRs	describe	IIAs	and	ISDS	as	a	serious	concern.	But	here	the	reports	are	ambivalent.	The	IPFSD	recommends	a	comprehensive	reform,	and	the	WIRs	list	a	series	of	policy	options.	Ultimately,	however,	the	reform	narrative	in	the	reports	only	suggests	marginal	changes.	The	WIRs	recommend	countries	to	implement	change	in	a	limited	and	selective	manner,	as	opposed	to	considering	ways	to	promote	local	preferences.	According	to	the	reports,	drastic	changes	may	give	a	negative	signal	to	TNCs	and	reduce	FDI	flows.35																																																										34	This	view	dominates	the	current	policy	debate	on	development.	See	Deborah	Elms	and	Patrick	Low	(Eds.),	Global	value	chains	in	a	changing	world	(WTO	2013).	Angel	Gurría,	OECD-G20	Global	Forum	on	international	investment.	Opening	remarks.	5	October	2015.	Available	at	http://www.oecd.org/investment/oecd-g20-global-forum-on-international-investment-opening-remarks.htm	(last	visited	2	March	2017).	35	The	narrative	of	tax	policies	shows	a	similar	tension	(WIR	2015:	177-8,	207-8).	
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5.	Conclusions:	25	Years	After		The	narrative	of	the	WIRs	revolves	around	development.	But	it	is	the	kind	of	development	that	TNCs	are	willing	to	provide	to	individuals,	local	communities	and	countries.	According	to	the	WIRs’	narrative,	TNCs	are	the	cause	and	consequence	of	a	global	economy	of	GVCs.	TNCs	own	key	proprietary	assets,	such	as	capital,	technology	and	management	skills,	which	they	can	mix	with	the	locational	advantages	of	host	countries	to	maximise	wealth.	Countries	need	to	attract	FDI	and	work	hard	to	reap	the	benefits.	In	this	tale,	the	missing	question	is	whose	expectations	count	in	a	TNC-assisted	restructuring	of	the	economy.	In	recommending	countries	to	climb	the	value	ladder	and	rely	on	FDI	to	bridge	the	investment	gap,	the	WIRs	tell	states	and	people	to	organise	around	the	expectations	of	TNCs.	This	result	occludes	propriety	and	a	social	order	based	on	local	preferences.	And	public	regulation	cannot	balance	this.			IIAs	and	ISDS	reflect	the	importance	of	TNCs	in	this	narrative.	TNCs	have	a	fundamental	role	in	a	world	where	countries	and	people	need	to	climb	the	value	ladder	and	bridge	the	investment	gap.	Because	of	this	key	role,	it	seems	unreasonable	to	congratulate	or	blame	investment	arbitrators	solely	for	their	interpretation	of	foreign	investor	rights.	Investment	awards	often	privilege	the	expectations	of	foreign	investors	because	the	realisation	of	these	expectations	allegedly	promotes	development.	This	is	no	different	from	what	the	courts	of	many	countries	were	doing	when	privileging	the	rights	of	industrial,	railway	or	construction	companies	over	other	property	owners	in	the	19th	and	early	20th	centuries.	That	profound	economic	transformation	also	exceeded	the	agency	of	a	number	of	judges.36	The	resulting	global	commodity	conception	of	foreign	investor	rights	has	provided	TNCs	with	the	opportunity	to	shape	state	and	local	structures	according	to	their	business	plans.	This	has	strong	implications	in	relational	terms.	The	need	to	attract	FDI	prompts	a	transactional	paradigm	between	TNCs	and	states,	which	many	TNCs	use	to	bargain	for	favourable	regulatory	conditions	and	incentives.	In	view	of	this	problem,	the	WIRs	recommend	states	to	increase	international	cooperation	and	their	bargaining	capabilities,	but	this	is	difficult	in	the	shadow	of	the	strong	competition	for	investment,	asymmetric	information,	and	the	IIAs	and	ISDS.	The	UN	has	voiced	its	concerns	about	TNC	bargaining	power	at	least	since	1973	–	many	WIRs	have	done	so	too.	But	most	reform	proposals,	including	those	in	2012-2015	WIRs,	do	not	tackle	directly	the	fairness	of	investment	bargains	or	the	need	to	respect	local	preferences	and	obtain	free,	prior	and	informed	consent	from	local	communities.		Instead,	the	WIRs	focus	on	public	regulation	as	the	counterweight	to	the	undesirable	effects	of	FDI.	The	WIRs	and	UNCTAD	have	done	a	remarkable	job	creating	awareness	for	the	need	to	reform	IIAs,	highlighting	that	ISDS	can	block	measures	needed	to	curb	negative	externalities	and																																																									36	See	Morton	Horwitz,	The	Transformation	of	American	Law,	1780-1860	(Harvard	University	Press1977)	31-139;	Alexander	(n	17)	247-76;	Stefano	Rodotà,	El	Terrible	
Derecho:	Estudios	Sobre	La	Propiedad	Privada	(Civitas	1986)	141-67.	
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market	failures.	The	reports	have	contributed	to	this	debate	enabling	many	states	to	consider	alternatives.	As	I	suggested	above,	however,	this	has	balanced	but	not	transformed	the	commodity	conception	of	foreign	investor	rights.	The	analysis	suggests	that	when	the	WIRs	refer	to	sustainability,	they	also	refer	to	the	protection	of	TNC-assisted	restructuring	from	host	states	and	local	communities.	Within	a	global	commodity	conception	of	property,	IIAs	and	ISDS	need	to	be	reoriented.	Otherwise,	a	crisis	of	this	regime	could	trigger	a	severe	backlash	against	the	TNC-assisted	restructuring	they	have	served	to	establish,	consolidate	and	protect.			
